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PETROSYANTS URGES 'CONSTRUCTIVE' TALKS ON TEST BAN

PM031413 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Article by A. Petrosyants, leader of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks of the problem of ending nuclear weapons tests and full member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences: "Ban on Nuclear Tests" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] It is exactly 13 years to the day since the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests.

I took part in the treaty signing ceremony in Moscow on 3 July 1974. The treaty was signed in Washington on the same day by the U.S. President.

The final act of signing the treaty was preceded by much strenuous work by the USSR and U.S. delegations. That work took place in a businesslike atmosphere although there were many disputes and discussions while difficult questions were being resolved. Finally, however, mutual understanding was reached and the treaty's articles and protocol were elaborated. It was decided to limit underground nuclear weapons tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons.

The U.S. side did not consider it possible to agree to a lower yield limit for an individual nuclear explosion as proposed by the Soviet side. Let me remind you in this connection that the yield of the nuclear bomb dropped by the U.S. Air Force on the Japanese city of Hiroshima was around 15 kilotons. Therefore, the limit set by the 1974 treaty was 10 times higher. Nevertheless, this was a victory, a victory for common sense which resulted in the limitation of nuclear explosions.

The 3 July 1974 treaty has still not been ratified by the supreme legislative organs of the USSR and the United States, for which the blame rests with the U.S. side because it has not presented it to Congress for ratification.

Several years later, in 1977, the USSR and the United States agreed to begin the preparation of a new document -- a treaty on a complete and general nuclear weapon test ban. The delegations began regular meetings in 1978. The work progressed successfully. My impression, as leader of the Soviet delegation, was highly favorable. Both the U.S. and British delegations (the treaty was being prepared for signing as a trilateral one) adopted a constructive stance and really worked together with us to complete the work of preparing a treaty in a very short time.

And indeed, in January 1981 the U.S. press was unanimous that the draft treaty could possibly be presented to the governments of the three countries (the USSR, the United States, and Britain) by the end of 1981. That opinion was shared both in Britain and here, in the USSR.

Things worked out differently however. With the advent of the Reagan administration, the White House broke off the talks in 1981. At a U.S. NSC session in July of 1982, President Reagan officially announced his decision to abandon further talks between the USSR, the United States, and Britain on the elaboration of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear weapon test ban. That was when the talks were completely broken off.

By coincidence quite a few events in the sphere of interest to us have occurred in July. It was on 16 July 1945 that the experimental detonation of the world's first nuclear device took place at Alamagordo (New Mexico). On 1 July 1946, the United States conducted a test explosion of a nuclear bomb at Bikini atoll designed to impress the foreign guests from a number of countries with the might of the U.S. Armed Forces.

In July 1986, the United States agreed to the Soviet Union's proposal for meetings of experts to examine the possibility of holding talks on nuclear tests with a view to ratifying the 3 July 1974 treaty. The USSR, in proposing such meetings, also had in mind the possibility of preparing talks on a complete and general nuclear test ban.

In the past year, five rounds of expert meetings and talks have been held. However, the U.S. agreement to prepare a treaty on a complete and general nuclear test ban has not been received yet.

On 13 July this year, our delegation will begin the sixth and latest round of talks with the U.S. delegation in Geneva. We would like to hope that we will finally be able to move on from fruitless political and diplomatic arguments to the discussion of concrete proposals on questions of monitoring [kontrol] nuclear explosions and to the examination of technical questions connected with the ratification of the 3 July 1974 treaty.

Incidentally, verification questions are often presented in the West, including in the United States, as the main stumbling block in the talks. Verification, improved verification, they say, is the main and essential condition in talks with the USSR, without which there can be no meaningful talks on nuclear weapon test questions. It is a well known fact, however, as our country's supreme leadership has stated many times, that the USSR agrees to all forms of verification including on-site inspection where necessary.

The White House's series of statements that the USSR is in breach of the 1974 treaty by exceeding the established 150-kiloton explosion limit do not promote the successful progress of the talks. It is highly noteworthy, however, that specific figures relating to that excess have never been cited anywhere but instead phrases such as "it seems," "it is highly likely," "it is presumed," and so forth are used. And with good reason too, because the USSR has never exceeded the established threshold. Our country has been observing the 1974 treaty precisely, scrupulously, and unswervingly.

When the Soviet Union imposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, including those for research purposes, observed that moratorium honestly for more than 18 months, and invited the United States and other nuclear powers to join it, none of them replied positively. Furthermore, the United States conducted nuclear explosions at an intensive rate, disregarding the will of the world public which welcomed the USSR's bold unilateral move.

As M.S. Gorbachev stated recently, even now the Soviet Union can send its representatives to full-scale test ban talks during which the question of the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties could be settled and the U.S. Congress' ideas on reducing the number of explosions and their yields could be considered. The sixth round of Soviet-U.S. discussion meetings, which begins on 13 July, must finally progress to the stage of constructive talks which may be difficult and complex but which move toward the ending of nuclear weapon tests and a complete and general test ban.

GRIGORYEV QUESTIONS UPBEAT VIEW OF ARMS TALKS

PM061107 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 87 Second Edition p 6

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev "Political Diary": "Pluses and Minuses"]

[Text] You need not be specially gifted to notice a certain cheerfulness in Western politicians' assessments and forecasts when the talk turns to the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. [paragraph continues]

Italian Foreign Minister G. Andreotti, for example, recently expressed the conviction that an agreement there "has become more than likely." Fernandez-Ordonez, his Spanish colleague, emphasized the importance of concluding a treaty on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles "as early as this year." On a visit to Finland French President F. Mitterrand remarked, with an eye on Geneva, that "the vicious circle of the arms race is not inevitable."

Well, this prospect exists. A unique opportunity has been opened up by the well-known Soviet proposals. The possibility has really emerged of concluding an agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles and thereby taking the first step toward eliminating nuclear arsenals and strengthening security and peace. Statements by West European figures reflect to some extent "restrained, cautious optimism," to use diplomatic language.

But let us take a close look at the Western mass media these days. They go much further. Virtual euphoria reigns in them. And it is being nurtured primarily from Washington.

Correspondents there besiege White House and State Department spokesmen every day. Is there a "breakthrough" in Geneva? Will there be a new meeting of the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers, and when? Rumors and patently deliberate "leaks" portray the situation in Geneva in an unprecedentedly rosy light. Even the FINANCIAL TIMES overcame its English reserve the day before yesterday. "Many specialists in the arms control sphere in Washington," it is reported from there, "are convinced that the main obstacles in the way of an agreement have been removed and that the remaining problems seem greater than they in fact are because the talks are at the concluding stage."

It is precisely the reference to specialists that elicits caution. For they must know how things really stand in Geneva. Pluses there may be, but are there really no serious minuses and drawbacks [izderzhki] there?

To summarize competent opinions which I have heard, it could probably be said that the talks on medium-range missiles are, by and large, proceeding well and formulations are being finalized for a joint draft agreement where unagreed positions are placed in parentheses. The public has been intimidated all the time with the problem of verification -- that will be the stumbling block, it is said. But here, too, the search is on in Geneva for a solution to what are objectively very complex problems. At the same time, if we are not to have our head in the clouds, we should ask ourselves if there are grounds for asserting that the preparations for a treaty are nearing completion. I would not undertake such an assertion. And the snag here is that the United States and its NATO allies, even after the well known constructive Soviet proposals and compromise steps, are erecting more and more obstacles. And their flimsy and artificial nature sticks out like a sore thumb.

Let us take the problem of operational and tactical missiles. The Americans want to "save" from the reckoning and from destruction their 72 nuclear warheads which are in the FRG for the same number of Pershing 1A operational and tactical missiles belonging to the Bundeswehr. Each one of those warheads is approximately 10 times more powerful than the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima. A total of 720 Hiroshimas! And they want to hide this potential in their pocket on the pretext that the Geneva talks do not concern the systems of third parties.

But if these warheads do not belong to the FRG and are U.S. property -- which is officially confirmed both in Bonn and in Washington -- what third party can there be a question of? There is no logic. It is a question of U.S. warheads.

In this connection they also try to hide behind "the existing system of cooperation with allies," which, they say, is not open to discussion either. However, if this cooperation includes the Bundeswehr's use of U.S. nuclear charges, this signifies a violation (and a double violation at that, on both the U.S. and the West German sides) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The U.S. side seems to have become entangled in its conditions and provisos, or is doing this consciously, but it is clear even to a child that the U.S. nuclear potential cannot be preserved unilaterally if the problem of eliminating operational and tactical missiles is to be solved.

They are also trying to manipulate Pershing-2's, raising the question of the "right" to reequip them as Pershing-1B operational and tactical missiles. But it is technically possible, as is known, to turn the latter back into the orginal medium-range missiles in a few hours.

Simple arithmetic. Something like subtraction and addition of missile stages. And it is such naive arithmetic that one American commentator placed it in the category of "trumps at the talks." But attempts at bluff also quite obviously characterize the NATO approach to the responsible task in Geneva.

The propaganda to the effect that things are going well is more subtle. They plainly wish to lull the international public with its help. To divert its attention away from the true stand of those NATO circles which put forward one condition after another, preventing an agreement in Geneva from being converted from a possibility into a reality.

CHERVOV, U.S.' DANIEL GRAHAM DEBATE SDI

PM031355 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Ivanko report on "IZVESTIYA Roundtable" discussion by U.S. Lieutenant General, retired, Daniel Graham and USSR Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate: "Dialogue of Generals. SDI: To Be or Not To Be?" -- first paragraph is Ivanko introduction]

[Text] One of the goals of the Warsaw Pact states' military doctrine is to prevent the spread of the arms race into space. But the U.S. SDI program pursues a diametrically opposite task. Which side is right, proceeding from the interests of international security? This problem is discussed by U.S. Lieutenant General, retired, Daniel Graham. He held the positions of CIA deputy director and director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the United States, subsequently retired and headed "High Frontier" -- an ultraconservative organization founded by him and one of the leading organizations lobbying in favor of SDI. The organization is directly involved in providing propaganda backup for this program. The question is: Who finances "High Frontier?" I asked this question of Gen Graham. "The organization's budget runs to approximately $3 million donated by 83,000 individual contributors. About 3 percent of the total sum is donated by companies working on developments in the military and aerospace spheres, and I would like then to give me more. I am not ashamed of this." And so, a dialogue between two generals: D. Graham and Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate. SDI: To be or not to be?

[Graham] SDI must be perceived as a change in U.S. strategy -- a switch from a strategy based on the principle of retaliation following a nuclear attack to a strategy proceeding from the principle of being more interested in living Americans than in dead Russians. The main problem of U.S. policy in the past was that it put us in a state of total unpreparedness in the event of a nuclear attack. [paragraph continues]

Now we intend to change this state by using the best technology we have -- space technology -- thus creating [sozdav] a nonnuclear means of defense against nuclear weapons. In the view of Soviet General N.A. Talenskiy, this would be a weapon that would start to function only as a result of aggression. I am convinced that it poses no threat to anyone, since it serve the purposes of U.S. defense. We are interested in protecting our citizens against offensive arms, and I hope that the Soviet Union is not interested in dead Americans, just as che United States is not interested in dead Russians.

[Chervov] When U.S. spokesmen speak in defense of the "Star Wars" program they argue that it pursues humanitarian and defense goals allegedly aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons. But these arguments raise doubts among many people. There are currently no weapons in space -- neither Soviet nor U.S. -- and there should not be weapons there! The Soviet Union has told the whole world that it would not be the first to take weapons into space -- this is our pledge. The USSR will also apply all its efforts to ensure that other countries, including the United States, do not take such a fatal step.

What are the consequences awaiting mankind in the event the "Star Wars" program materializes? First of all, the risk of war will increase. Why do we think this? Space strike arms are being created [sozdayutsya] under the SDI program. The weapons thatwould be launched into space could, in the first place, destroy the other side's most important satellites, rendering it blind and dead and thus deprivingit of an opportunity to counter any aggression by the opponent. These weapons are offensive also because they can be used to destroy targets on earth, in space, at sea, and in the air. They have a range of thousands of kilometers, and are thus universal weapons. If the SDI program is implemented, the international situation will be destabilized further still, and the treaties in the sphere of disarmament and security will be undermined, primarily the ABM Treaty which provides the basis of Soviet-U.S. relations and international security. Furthermore, if weapons are launched into space, the talks on nuclear and space weapons, and on the stragegic arms problem in particular, will become pointless. Under such conditions, the Soviet side will be unable to reduce its strategic offensive weapons. On the contrary, it will improve them in order to take the appropriate countermeasures for the country's security.

[Ivanko] Gen Graham, and other advocates of the SDI program, make reference to certain statements made by Soviet military leaders in the past. Nikolay Fedorovich, to what extent are these quotations correct, or has the Soviet Union's stance changed with the passage of time?

[Chervov] No, the Soviet stance has not changed. I believe the references to N.A. Talenskiy, A.N. Kosygin, and N.V. Ogarkov are isolated phrases quoted out of context. Indeed, A.N. Kosygin did say in 1967 (well before the conclusion of the ABM Treaty) that "defensive weapons are not a cause of the arms race." This is why we and the U.S. side agreed to have individual limited regions covered by ABM defense. Now, however, we are talking about something completely different -- the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM defense system with space-based elements. The creation [sozdaniye] of such a system, President Reagan declared, coupled with offensive strategic weapons, is a concept of aggression. The U.S. side is trying to ignore this statement by Reagan, to forget it, but it does indeed reflect reality.

[Graham] My Soviet colleagues constantly quote U.S. legislators, and I see nothing wrong in making reference to Soviet leaders with whom I agree. I fully support the statements by Gen N.A. Talenskiy and A.N. Kosygin, and the opinion expressed by Marshal N.V. Ogarkov in 1982 that "strategic defense is not only necessary, it is inevitable." I selected these quotations in order to prove that Soviet leaders in the recent past agreed with me.

[Chervov] Marshal N.V. Ogarkov never spoke in defense of the "Strategic Defense Initiative"; he did indeed make a statement on the need for strategic defense but he was talking about defense by ground-based means and not by space-based echelons. SDI is aimed against the ABM Treaty, and Ogarkov would never advocate that this treaty be blown up, on the contrary, we are striving to strengthen it. Thus, my colleague is misrepresenting the principles expressed by N.V. Ogarkov.

[Ivanko] Gen Graham, you have said on many occasions that it is impossible to create [sozdat] a 100-percent defense system, so why create [sozdavat] SDI which is expensive and, in any case, causes so many contradictions?

[Graham] Now we have a purely offensive potential and, in the event of an attack, will always be able to respond -- even from the grave. All I am calling for is what the Soviet Union has been doing for a long time now. You have never believed that there is no need to protect the country against a possible nuclear attack. According to my data, the USSR's spending on the creation [sozdaniye] of strategic defense is as much as, if not more than, its spending on the creation [sozdaniye] of strategic offensive potential. I suggest that the United States does exactly the same, using currently available technology including space-based elements. Yes, we will not achieve a 100-percent defense, this has never existed in history. I am amazed by the strange idea expressed by my colleague, Gen Chervov, that the deployment of defensive means indicates preparation for attack -- according to this logic, the United States ought to be terribly frightened of attack by the USSR since you have a defense system.

[Chervov] The Americans definitely avoid mentioning the fatal consequences for mankind if weapons were launched into space. The only thing we hear is that this means protection, this means defense, and that it is better than attack. But having created [sozdav] a space shield, it is possible to hide beneath it, threaten with strategic missiles, and engage in nuclear blackmail. In fact, such a policy leads to the undermining of Soviet-U.S. relations. Neither side can currently deliver a nuclear strike, since retaliation would inevitably follow. But the shield is being created [sozdayetsya] in order to gain an opportunity to deliver a nuclear strike with impunity.

And now about the existence of an ABM defense in the Soviet Union. Gen Graham did not go into details, but here is what we are talking about. When we concluded the ABM Treaty we agreed that the USSR and the United States could have one region each, with a 150-km radius, covered by ABM defense. The Soviet Union chose Moscow as such a region, and the U.S. side chose the "Grand Forks" ICBM base. The sides are allowed to have 100 antimissile launch installations, 100 antimissiles, and a few radar stations each in these regions. This is what the ABM Treaty allows.

What is the situation in the United States? Its radar stations are on combat alert, antimissile launch installations and antimissiles are mothballed, but this makes no difference under the treaty. Regardless of their status -- on alert or mothballed -- they are equally covered by the treaty. Here is a comparison: It does not matter whether your money is in your pocket or in the bank, it still is the same money. This is why I find it strange to hear Gen Graham say that the Soviet Union has a defense system and the United States does not. Nothing like that at all exists -- we both have it, according to the ABM Treaty.

[Graham] What I meant was not so much the existence of a certain quantity of missiles, but a sensible strategy. In my view, it makes perfect sense for the Soviet Union to defend itself as well as possible. I cannot understand your indignation at all, Chervov, because we also want to defend ourselves. What is bad about this, do we by any chance look like someone wanting to start a war?

[Chervov] Back in 1972, when we and the U.S. side sat around the negotiating table, the first question was: What is to happen with ABM defense. At that time, the United States was working apace in this sphere and was ready to deploy an ABM defense system, and we were also conducting similar work. And so, the question was: It would be impossible to reduce strategic offensive arms if ABM systems to defend the country's territory were to be deployed. Therefore, the first point on which both sides agreed was: Let us limit ABM defense, and as a result we came to the treaty. At the same time, an interim agreement was concluded on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. It was no accident that both the ABM Treaty and SALT I were signed the same day -- 26 May 1972. In the case of SDI, defense is just a play on words, what is being created [sozdayetsya] is a space strike weapon which is offensive. It can, of course, be described as defensive, but this not change its essence and meaning. What is being created [sozdayetsya] is a weapon of aggression, a weapon of global and instantaneous action. Such a weapon can only be operated by computers, its control is beyond human reason.

[Ivankov] Gen Graham and Gen Chervov, do you share any points of contact, is there anything at all on which your views coincide?

[Graham] As I understand it the Soviet side, including Gen Chervov, agrees that research and tests can be carried out within the SDI framework, and therefore accords are possible on certain details. For many years now the Soviet military establishment -- and I have long followed these matters -- has been of the opinion that more attention ought to be given to defense, and I hope that with the passage of time the Soviet side would come to accept that defense, as N. Ogarkov says, is "inevitable and necessary."

[Chervov] The U.S. side, and President Reagan in particular, declares that the SDI program will be a research program. We agree with this principle. It is here that we have apparent points of contact. Moreover, at the talks we moved toward the U.S. side and explained what we understood by research program. We are talking about research and tests of components of the SDI program within the framework of scientific research institutes, manufacturing plants, and test sites and ranges under stationary conditions. We are against weapons being tested in space; this is prohibited by the ABM Treaty and we would like this provision of the treaty to be honored. We also proposed the following to the Americans: Let us examine which specific means can, and which cannot, be launched into space. In other words, let us define permitted and prohibited activities in the ABM defense sphere. Let me give a simple example. Let us take satellites, as a means of communications. Lasers can be used to study outer space, but beyond a certain level of power, lasers turn into weapons. Scientists, both U.S. and Soviet, have proved that lasers become weapons when their power reaches 10 raised to the power of (?19) [figure indistinct] joules. This is the point where we say to the Americans: Lasers of such capacity cannot be launched into space since they are weapons. The question is: How do you monitor? Monitoring is possible via on-site inspection by representatives of scientists and experts at the launch of every rocket. We believe that the U.S. side and ourselves could agree on this basis and limit SDI to just research purposes. So far, the U.S. side has been unwilling to discuss these issues with us in Geneva. But we hope that the United States will still change its stance.

TOLKUNOV ADDRESSES PACT PARLIAMENTARIANS' MEETING

PM031449 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Forum of Parliamentarians"]

[Text] Warsaw, 2 Jul -- The tasks of parliaments in strengthening the socialist community's all-round cooperation and integration and in increasing their contribution to the implementation of the socialist countries' peace-loving course are the subject of discussion in a meeting of chairmen of parliaments from the Warsaw Pact countries being held in the Polish capital.

The meeting was addressed by L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union. He emphasized that today, when socialism has entered a qualitatively new stage of development, the deepening of collaboration along all avenues, including along parliamentary lines, has the effect of not only creating but also augmenting our potential and services a a powerful stimulus for accelerating common progress. There can be no doubt that parliaments and their permanent commissions have considerable opportunities at their disposal to ensure their much more active and bolder involvement in the solution of the complex and at times acute problems on our countries' agendas.

The speaker briefed the participants in detail on the extensive work being done in the Soviet Union on restructuring, democratization, and the deepening of the people's socialist self-management. He drew attention to the results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet session. The plenum, he said, translated the ideas of restructuring into practical terms. It can be said without any exaggeration that the plenum will become a landmark of historic importance along the path of the acceleration of socioeconomic develpment. It is necessary for the fraternal countries' parliaments to make a weightier contribution to the common cause of economic, scientific, and technical progress, applying both legislative levers and their monitoring functions to this purpose, and actively assisting the monitoring functions to this purpose, and actively assisting the solution of pressing problems. Particular attention must be devoted to questions concerning the restructuring of the socialist economic integration mechanism in CEMA's activity.

The parliaments of socialist countries can and must make a greater contribution to the cause of implementing the basic principles of the socialist community's peace-loving policy in the spirit of the documents of the Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. And the duty of socialist community countries' parliaments today is to support the jointly elaborated far-reaching initiatives with their every action and step in the international arena. There is no doubt that our parliaments could make a weighty contribution to the further advance of numerous proposals.

The need to further expand the sphere of collaboration between the parliaments of Warsaw Pact states, L.N. Tolkunov noted, stems from objective factors, from the growing rule of parliaments in resolving the tasks of socialist building, their real potential for influencing the development of relations and the situation in the world, and the actual process of bringing our countries closer together. It is the duty of our parliaments to make their weighty contribution to the noble cause -- the struggle for averting the military threat and for a peaceful future.

PYADYSHEV HOLDS FOREIGN MINISTRY BRIEFING

Discusses Persian Gulf

LD071403 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1331 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 7 Jul (TASS) -- Attention has been given in the Soviet capital to the statement by White House chief of staff, Howard Baker, about the U.S. readiness, under certain conditions, "to take a fresh look at the situation" in the Persian Gulf, with a view to reducing the U.S. naval presence there, Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Department, said today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists.

As is known, the Soviet Government has already proposed the all naval vessels of states which have nothing to do with the Persian Gulf region should be withdrawn from the waters of the Gulf immediately.

If the above statement by Howard Baker means on the whole a positive attitude to the Soviet proposal, then we welcome the statement as a step in the right direction. One gets the impression, Boris Pyadyshev continued, that the probability of going along with us along the path we have suggested, that is, withdrawal of naval vessels from the waters of the Persian Gulf, is being weighed up in the United States.

Such a turn of events would be welcomed in the countries of the region, which is experiencing a rise in tension created not least of all in connection with the build-up of the military presence of the United States in the Persian Gulf, the Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed.

Replying to a question from the correspondent of the U.S. 'NEWSWEEK' magazine, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that by comparison with the numbers of the U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf zone, the number of Soviet ships is incomparably smaller. If U.S. warships are withdrawn from the zone, and also the navel vessels of Britain and France, then the USSR will join with these steps, and Soviet naval vessels will certainly be withdrawn from the Persian Gulf zone.

Notes FRG's Genscher's Visit

LD071535 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1445 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 7 Jul (TASS) -- Conversations and a luncheon took place this morning in a building of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Aleksey Tolstoy Street. Taking part were USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze and FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher. This was reported today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists by Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the information of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the conversation, the matter of nuclear weapons in Europe was examined in detail. On the Soviet side, arguments were put forward in favor of the need for an agreement on INF, which would be the first step, and a major one, along the road toward solving the problem of European nuclear disarmament. The Soviet proposal, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed, takes into consideration all the Europeans' fears and satisfies their wishes concerning the content of the accors.

But fresh obstacles are being put forward by the European side, hampering the reaching of accords. One of them is the demand for retaining the U.S. warheads for the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missiles. For what purpose is this being done? Perhaps the FRG is calculating on placing the warheads under its own control? But that would be the crudest violation of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom, Boris Pyadyshev said.

On the question of Pershing-1A missiles, a rather strange picture is taking shape. The United States is nodding to the FRG Government, which is hiding behind Washington's back. Some people in Bonn say it is a Soviet-U.S. problem, and if that is the case, the Soviet Union should convince the Americans in Geneva of the need to solve it. But it is quite obvious and no one should be in any doubt, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said, that it is not just a question of the United States position but also of the FRG position.

'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'

LD040016 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 3 Jul 87

["International Situation -- Question and Answers" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov, foreign policy commentator of All-Union Radio, with Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS observer on military matters; Dmitriy Morozov, candidate of historical sciences; and Vladimir Fadeyev, not further identified]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] Good day, comrades. In sorting out our program's mail -- and this time it is particularly plentiful, since the program was not on the air last week -- I became convinced that as always the majority of radio listeners are most interested in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations at the contemporary stage. This is not surprising since it is clear to everyone that the situation on the planet depends to a significant if not to a decisive extent on the policies of the USSR and the United States and their concrete actions in the international arena. But these actions show that for the time being, unfortunately, the sides see ways to lower tension and the level of military confrontation and attain real accord on weapons control differently.

As is known, the Soviet Union has come forward with a number of constructive proposals and has made certain concessions which have made it possible to talk about the possibility of concluding an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe in the near future. Conditions were also created for attaining accord on operational and tactical missiles. What about the United States and its allies in the NATO block? Making use of various kinds of reservations and pretexts, putting forward far-fetched and clearly unjust conditions, they are trying in every way to delay the resolving of these most important current problems.

How can one not concur with the view of our radio listener (Ivan Nikolayevich Bochkov) from the village of Russkaya Sorma in the Chuvash ASSR, who writes: In political talks between the USSR and the United States, it is essential to always show a businesslike, reasonable approach, meeting the interests of both countries, to solving problems which have come to the fore. Only a realistic appraisal, not a negative position, can open up constructive ways and methods to get out of a critical position or an impasse. Comrade Bochkov stresses: The unwillingness of the United States to resolve the question of the impermissibility of nuclear war shows that the Reagan administration is pushing both its own people and the people of other countries toward ruin, to the limits of destruction itself.

Why does the United States take such an unconstructive position? How is its unwillingness to go for realistic steps in the field of disarmament explained? How are the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva proceeding at the moment? These and a series of similar questions are asked in letters from Comrades (Yemchenko) from Krasnodar Kray, (Makarov) from the village of (Krivoz Erye) in Penza Oblast, and many other radio listeners. I ask Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev, TASS observer on military questions, to answer them:

Vladimire Nikolayevich, what is the state of affairs at the moment at the Geneva talks on the problem of medium-range missiles?

[Chernyshev] The Soviet proposal on the separate resolving of the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe has highlighted in a new way the state of affairs at the talks. The main question has today been put on a practical plane: Is there or is there not to be an agreement which would lead to the elimination in Europe of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles, limit their minimal level outside Europe and thereby make it possible to implement a real breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament?

What is the Soviet position at the moment? First and foremost it ought to be noted that it is based on the accords attained in Reykjavik. Also, everything positive that emerged during preceding discussions at talks is taken into account. In particular, it is envisaged that the elimination of the Soviet Union's and the United States' medium-range missiles in Europe would be carried out in two stages over the course of 5 years. During the first stage the medium-range missiles and launch installations for medium-range missiles would be reduced by 50 percent, and in the second stage they would be fully eliminated. Simultaneous with the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States would implement measures for the limitation by each side to 100 warheads of medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the territory of the Soviet Union and on the national territory of the United States. The process of eliminating medium-range missiles would be started simultaneously by both sides and would be implemented under strict mutual monitoring [kontrolem].

The Soviet Union has also proposed the elimination in Europe of the USSR's and the United States' operational and tactical missiles, that is, missiles with a range of from 500 to 1,000 km. Outside Europe it is proposed to resolve the question of such missiles on the analogy of medium-range missiles, that is, limiting by agreed miminal levels. The Soviet position also envisages an orderly system of verification [kontrolya] of the fulfillment of the future treaty. For example, it is envisaged that the dismantling or the destruction of medium-range missiles, launch installations, and corresponding auxiliary equipment, will be carried out in specially agreed areas. Verification measures [mery kontrolya] embrace both the exchange of data and observations, including on-site inspections [inspektsiyi] if necessary. Moreover, inspections would be carried out both within the limits of the territory of the other side and within the limits of the territory of third countries where, for example, the United States' medium-range missiles are deployed [pazmeshcheny].

It would seem that the Soviet draft is the basis that may allow in the shortest time for the working out of a joint Soviet-U.S. draft and for its submission for ratification to the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States. However, it is still too early to say that all obstacles for attaining such a result have been removed. In the United States' position, there remain as before conditions which objectively hinder the achievement of accord and which do no meet the task of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation but are rather calculated at preserving the United States' missile presence in Europe under a different pretext.

To speak generally, the course of the present talks of medium-range missiles shows that neither the United States nor certain of its allies in NATO, while proclaiming adherence to any solution on medium-range missiles, thought seriously about it, thinking that the Soviet Union would neve accept it. It is this that explains all manner of obstacles which are now being put forward on the road to resolving the question.

[Ptashnikov] But recently a meeting of the NATO council would seem to have adopted a decision to answer positively the Soviet proposal n medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. So, what is hindering the attainment of an agreement in Geneva? Could you not describe what elements in the U.S. position have been an obstacle?

[Chernyshev] Well first and foremost I would note three main obstacles in the U.S. position. First, we are talking about the United States; striving to write into a future treaty the right to reequip Pershing-2 medium-range missiles located in Europe as missiles with a shorter range. What does this mean in practice? It means that after a small alteration, the procedure for which has already been worked out in the United States at enterprises of the Martin Marietta concern, the second stage is removed from a Pershing-2 missile; the first stage with the nuclear warhead is left; some electronic equipment on launch installations is replaced and the Pershing-2 thereby would seem to stop existing. But that is only as it seems. In actual fact, according to specialists, including U.S. ones, the reverse operation is carried out no less simply. The second stage is brought in, the sets of electronic equipment are restored, and in a matter of 48 hours or so you again have a Pershing-2 missile in combat condition. So, if such a procedure were allowed, the removal of the U.S. Pershing-2 missiles from Europe would become the purest fiction. Equally unattractive is the U.S position on land-based cruise missiles of the medium-range class. They want to retain the right to keep these missile in Europe instead of destroying them. Moreover, the propsoal is that they should either remove the warheads from the missiles, or else transfer the misiles themselves to ships at sea.

The second thing that ought to be noted as an obstacle to reaching an acccord is the order of reduction being proposed by the United States. Acdording to the U.S. scenario, only the Soviet Union's medium-range missile will be reduced in the first stage, while the United States would merely verify [proveryat] and inspect the actions of the USSR. The U.S. bases and the U.S. missiles would remain closed to verification [kontrol] by the Soviet side. It is obvious that this approach is not in accord with the principle of equality and identical security. Therefore the Soviet proposal envisages the need for a simultaneous process of elimination of Soviet and U.S medium-range missiles in Europe. Even with the difference in quantity -- let me remind you that the Soviet Union is going to reduce more weapons than the United States -- that reduction could be carried out in equal percentages. It is also necessary that a system of verification [kontrol] should come into operation from the very beginning in both directions, so that the Soviet Union can be sure the destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe is being carried out in accordance with the agreement reached.

Finally, the third obstacle is the unwillingness of the United States to accept the principle proposed by the Soviet Union, under which the medium-range missiles remaining on the national territory of the USSR and the United States must be sited [razmeshchatsya] in such a way that their warheads cannot reach the territory of the other side.

That proposal is dictated by the fact that the deployment [razmeshcheniye] of medium-range missiles by the United States within range of the territory of the USSR -- in Alaska, for instance -- would mean in effect that the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union would be increased while the USSR was in no way increasing the nuclear threat to the United States, and would, moreover, be reducing its nuclear armaments. Appeals to the notion that the United States cannot agree to give up the right to deploy [razmeshchat] some of its medium-range missiles in Alaska because Alaska is part of its national territory simply do not bear examination After all, the Soviet Union is willing to introduce certain restrictions, even in its own territory, on the deployment of its remaining medium-range missiles. Among such restrictions would be, for example, the following: They would not be deployed west of the 80th meridian, so that they would not reach the territory of Western Europe, and they would also be deployed so that in the eastern and northeastern direction they would not be within range of the territory of the United States.

[Ptashnikov] In connection with a possible agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, there is a lot of talk in the NATO countries about the West German Pershing-1A missiles. It is being claimed that the Soviet demands concerning these missiles are holding back the talks. Is there any truth in that?

[Chernyshev] No, none at all. I think this issue needs to be clarified, because it is being presented to the world public in an obviously distorted way. First of all it must be emphasized that the Soviet Union is not raising the question of missiles and launching facilities belonging to a third country that is not a party to the Soviet-U.S. talks, that is, West Germany. Let common sense, and the sense of responsibility to the peoples that is so necessary in our time, tell the West Germany Government what it should do with those missiles and launching facilities. What is under discussion in Geneva is something quite different: the nuclear warheads that belong to the United States and are not destined for West German missiles. Now these certainly are not weapons belonging to third countries, as Washington and Bonn are trying to make out If they belonged to West Germany, then a most serious problem would arise: the problem of violation by the United States and the Federal Republic of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Under Article 1 of that treaty, the United States undertook not to transfer nuclear weapons and control over them to anyone, either directly or indirectly; and under Article 2 of the same treaty, the FRG undertook not to accept the transfer from anyone of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly. If both sides are fulfilling the treaty, then the United States does still remain the owner of the warheads for the West German missiles; and consequently, to consider them as weapons belonging to third countries is simply absurd. From this follows the legitimacy of the Soviet demand that these warheads be destroyed during the total elimination of the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

So, even though after many months of delays and shake-ups, NATO would appear to have given a positive answer to the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. Yet the elucidations that followed, and the actual U.S. position at the talks, certainly put us in our guard. Once again, as so often before, we see attempts to retreat from what had been agreed between Washington and Moscow at the political level. Once again, demands are being put to the Soviet Union that run counter to the principles of equivalent security.

[Ptashnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, one more question, on an area in which you are an expert. It comes from Comrade Grishko, of Goryachiy Klyuch in Krasnodar Kray. He would like to know what third generation nuclear weapons are. [passage omitted]

Prominent in today's mail are letters from listeners touching on matters concerning Afghanistan. [passage omitted]

I ask my colleague, Vladimir Fadeyev, to speak in greater detail about some of the questions raised in the letters.

[Fadeyev] I begin with a letter from Comrade Kozlov, of Primorskiy Rayon, Arkhangelsk Oblast. He writes: Your correspondent said in one of your programs that he was against the use of the term civil war; but at the same time, he estimated the forces of the counterrevolution -- quoting foreign sources -- as numbering 90,000. So, says the writer of the letter, this is a full-scale war; and since our military contingent entered Afghanistan when a government hostile to the USSR was in power there, he -- the writer -- sees no juridical difference between the presence of our troops in that country and, for example, the intervention by the countries of the entente which defended the interests of the tsarist and provisional governments.

Comrade Kozlov, the correspondent who opposed the term civil war in Afghanistan was me. Here is why: If there were a civil war there, then we would have had no right to respond to the appeal of the then Government of Afghanistan for military assistance. What may at first have seemed to resemble a civil war actually turned out to be very definite interference from outside. It was then, and still is, a matter not only of financial and military support of the dushmans by the West, but of systematic instusions into the territory of Afghanistan by specially trained formations, trained on the territory of neighboring Pakinstan. It is another matter that the dushmans are themselves Afghans. But what of it? The enemies of the Afghan people, international imperialism, seek support above all among the Afghans themselves. Among which is another question. You are wrong when you say that in those years the Government of Afghanistan was hostile to us. That was not so. The fact that many members of the Central Committee and of the government, after the removal of Amin, joined the government of Babrak Karmal and formed the backbone of the Central Committee of the party indicates just the opposite. But just now I am not talking about Amin. Several people, including Amin, were removed from the Central Committee, but that gives no grounds for identifying them with the strong and healthy nucleus of the party.

Your analogies concerning the entry of our troops at the request of the legitimate Government of Afghanistan and the intervention of the entente are, in my view, simply inappropriate and historically groundless. In the period to which you refer, there was a legitimate government of workers and peasants in power in Soviet Russia, which had not invited any of the entente countries, whereas the Taraki government had asked for our help.

Then, as to the third point in your letter, about the numerical strength of the dushman formations and the numbers of Afghan refugees: I was quoting foreign press figures. So I will repeat what was said at Uralmash and what you refer to in your letter. The strength of the dushman formations is up to 90 or more thousand; the number of refugees is 2 and 1/2 million. That is the approximate number of Afghans living, with that status, in Pakistan alone.

Comrade Dikman, who lives in Belostotskiy Pereulok, Kharkov, asks why our country did not respond to Taraki's 14 requests for military aid. We did not respond to the repeated requests for military aid only because we hoped the Afghan comrades would have the strength to cope with the difficult situation by themselves. Well, the time came when the United States sharply stepped up their help to the dushmans and esclated the undeclared war.

It can be said without any doubt at all that the moment we responded to the appeal for military help was a critical one for the destiny of Afghanistan as a sovereign state.

Comrades Mosin and Goncharova of Chernogorsk ask, what is Babrak Karmal doing now? The answer is that Comrade Karmal, whose merits and role in the emergence of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and in strengthening the positions of democratic Afghanistan have been evaluated highly by the party, has at the present time been relieved of all the posts formerly held by him at his request for health reasons.

Comrade Belkin, from the village of Kolyshma in Vologda Oblast, puts the question of the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Our willingness to take that step has been stated repeatedly by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. But it is not just a matter of our desire, which, it must be said, is that of our whole nation. The question also has international aspects. Comrade Belkin thinks that by our presence we are turning against us at a certain number of people in various countries. Possibly. But now let us imagine that today, in the Afghan people's hour of need, we leave them to the mercy of the dushmans. Their leaders, or rather ringleaders, make no secret of the fact that they would drown in blood the party, the youth and women's movement, and all who are suspected of sympathizing with the April revolution, if suddenly -- which, of course, will never happen -- they got the upper hand. Our presence in Afghanistan, comrades, is also moral support for the people. But, to return to the present situation, I want to remind Comrade Belkin again that, yes, we are willing to pull out our remaining troops, and we want to do so, but the Americans very much do not want that. It is to their advantage that we should become more deeply caught up in the Afghan problem. They are gambling on that. The Americans have in their hands not a few levers they could use to bring Pakistan to its senses -- Pakistan, which is the bridgehead of the aggression against Afghanistan -- but they are in no hurry to put them into effect.

Comrade Belkin reproaches us for constantly evading an answer regarding the number of dead and wounded Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. Judging by your letter, Comrade Belkin, you are an elderly man; and you know that the Sovinformburo, during the civil war, never reported any casualty figures. Nor do we have any such figures in our editorial office. So you are wrong to accuse us of lack of openness [glasnost]. But I will tell you this: There is an openness of words, and there is an openness of ideas, an openness of deeds. The Soviet Government has resolutely declared, and that more than once, that it is willing to bring our lads home. We began that process last year, even a bit earlier. I am sure, as one who has worked for several years in Afghanistan, that as soon as the other interested parties show even a fraction of our goodwill in this matter, that process will be continued, and eventually completed. Perhaps then the time will come when the losses will be announced. After all, openness is not a situation for some set period of time; the party has said that from now on, that is how it will be always. Personally, I am none too impressed by your persistence. The position of our country in that region is known; our friends know about it, and so do our enemies. [passage omitted]

USSR OFFICIALS DISCUSS PLENUM IN GENEVA

LD071700 Moscow TASS in English 1641 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva July 7 TASS -- A news conference held at the mission of the USSR in Geneva was devoted to the results of the June Plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee.

Ivan Ivanov, vice-chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission under the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, spoke about the substance of the decisions taken by the meeting and the guidelines for reforms and structural changes in the management of the Soviet economy and foreign trade.

The approved measures reflect the Soviet Union's new thinking in the approach to its domestic and foreign policies, said Ernest Obminskiy, head of the Economic Relations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. He pointed out that their implementation would have a marked impact on world economics and international economic relations.

Yevgeniy Makeyev, permanent representative of the U.S.S.R. to the U.N. office and internatinal organizations in Geneva, said that the restructuring of the economy should be regarded as a contribution to the establishment of a new international economic order and of international economic security. It is a component part of a comprehensive system of international security, he emphasized.

UN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL COUNCIL DEBATE NOTED

PM071017 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Kuznetsov dispatch: "Learning To Live Together"]

[Text] Geneva -- Each country can contribute to reducing international tension and creating favorable conditions for economic and technological cooperation in the world.

E. Novoryta [name as published], chairman of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), stated this when opening the general debate at the second routine session.

Spokesmen from Brazil, Peru, Senegal, the GDR, and other countries spoke in their addresses of the need to establish fair economic relations.

Speeches by the heads of delegations from the United States, the EEC, the Netherlands, and other Western countries struck a sharply discordant note. They tried to present the current position in the world economy in a rosy light and to obscure the negative phenomena arising through the fault of the United States and its allies.

The Warsaw Pact states, USSR delegation head E.Ye. Obminskiy said, analyzed the prevailing situation and adopted the document "On Overcoming Underdevelopment and Establishing a New International Economic Order." It notes the pressing need for fundamental changes in political thinking and international practice, a fair international division of labor, and the implementation of inalienable sovereignty over national natural resources.

A fundamental task, the USSR spokesman stressed, is facing all countries without exception -- without ignoring social, political and ideological contradictions, mastering the science and art of behaving in the international arena with restraint and caution. Only by guaranteeing man a peaceful future will it be possible to fully realize all countries' potential for economic development and cooperate effectively and to everyone's mutual advantage.

U.S. ENVOY ADDRESSES PEOPLE ON INDEPENDENCE DAY

LD041838 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Jul 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; speech by U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock in studio on anniversary of Independence Day; Matlock speaks in Russian -- live or recorded]

[Text] Today the people of the United States are making their national holiday, Independence Day. Taking part in our program is Jack Matlock, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States in the Soviet Union.

[Matlock] Esteemed viewers. It is a great pleasure to greet you on the day of the 211th anniversary of the independence of my country, the United States of America. This day reminds us Americans of our history and our traditions. It can be said that our country is varied regarding the peoples living there. There is no country with which the past of our people has not been connected, and our society has imbibed the life-giving forces of many cultures. More than once we have run into problems, which were new not only for our country, but for all of mankind. This has taught us to solve the most difficult problems by means of open discussion and mutual respect for different points of view. Of course, we have not always managed to fully achieve our ideals, but we aspire ceaselessly toward them, and they constantly inspire us.

An American living in Moscow cannot but think of the relations of our two countries, and these mutual relations are not those which we would like to have. But we do have reasons for mutual satisfaction. Our countries have never fought against each other. More than that, when both our countries were threatened by mortal danger we stood shoulder to shoulder. This fills us with hope, and makes us believe that the difficulties existing between us can be overcome. In comparison with the recent past, our relations are in the process of improving. The leaders of our countries have already met twice. It was noted in Geneva that nuclear war must not be unleashed, and that there can be no victors in it. And in Reykjavik our positions came even closer together. I would like to point out that during the past year and a half, our cultural and social links have come to life. It seems to me that at the current time there is a real possibility for a fundamental improvement in our mutual relations.

For this we must first of all refrain from the use of military force for the solution of thorny questions in whatever part of the world they may arise. Second, we must start on a radical cut of nuclear arms, which we have in principle already agreed on. Third, we must go on removing obstacles on the path of contacts between the broad public of our countries, on a basis of generally accepted humanitarian values. The U.S. Government intends to contribute to the achievement of these goals. So I am speaking to you today with joy and hope in my heart, and pass on to all of you, on behalf of the American people, best wishes for health, happiness, and prosperity. Thank you for your attention.

IZVESTIYA INTERVIEWS JIMMY CARTER ON ARMS TOPICS

PM071225 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Jimmy Carter by A. Shalnev: "Jimmy Carter: If I Were President..." -- date and place unspecified; first three paragraphs are Shalnev introduction]

[Text] It is the custom in America: Someone who was once governor of a state or a senator in Congress is called "Governor" of "Senator" to the end of his days. [paragraph continues]

It is the same with former presidents: Jimmy Carter, who left the White House in January 1981, is still called "Mr President." Carter, who holds no elective office, devotes a considerable amount of time to his hobbies -- joinery (he is an expert furniture-maker) and writing (his latest book, which was published recently, is already on the best-seller lists). But the experience he accumulated in his 4 years in the White House and the wide contacts he established at the time with the leaders of other countries naturally cannot fail to leave their mark on how the public and press react to what Carter says, what he proposes, and the people he meets. In short, his voice is heeded -- particularly when the former president speaks on foreign policy matters. This attention is largely the result of comparing the Carter administration's foreign policy activity with that of the present administration -- a comparison which reveals an extremely important fact: Carter's 4-year rule was marked by the signing of the SALT II treaty, whereas Reagan's 6-year rule has been marked by the undermining of accords in the arms control sphere and, in particular, by the direct rejection of SALT II and the absence, so far at least, of any new agreements.

...My interview with Carter was brief -- only 12 minutes: The former president, who was on a private visit to our country, was running behind schedule. But on the same day he held a press conference at the U.S. Embassy. So I will supplement the short statements he made during the interview with his replies at the press conference.

[Shalnev] How have you been received in Moscow, Mr President?

[Carter] I have been received as someone who signed SALT II. The reception accorded me was exceptionally constructive and friendly. My meetings have left me with the most favorable impression.

[Shalnev] The official report on your talk in the Kremlin stated that you remarked, referring to the information you received as a result of your numerous meetings in various countries, that there is a prevailing desire worldwide to see the Soviet Union succeed in the transformations it has initiated. Could you possibly be a little more specific on that score?

[Carter] The leaders with whom I met consider openness and publicity to be positive... I think that Soviet policy in the nuclear arms control sphere is assessed on its merits -- as a policy that opens up a possibility for more rapid progress than in recent years.

[Shalnev] Since we have moved on to the subject of arms control, could you answer the following question: You are known as a critic of the "Star Wars" program. Why do you criticize it?

[Carter] It would be better for me to make those criticisms in the States rather than Moscow.

[Shalnev] Tell me, if you were president now, what would you do differently from Reagan in the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations and in the arms control sphere?

[Carter] It seems to me that Reagan, as I understand it, made certain good proposals at Reykjavik. I want to give him his due. I hope that in the near future we will witness success in solving the question of medium-range missiles. I assume that those conducting the talks are close enough to an agreement to allow it to be ratified under Reagan. If I were president, I would like to see firm adherence to agreements that have already been concluded. I would insist that the SALT II treaty not be violated and that both sides adhere precisely to its provisions. I would advocate a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty oppose the use of space for destructive weapons. I think I would strive for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

[Shalnev] To return to the medium-range missile question, what else can you say on that score?

[Carter] It seems to me that both sides should be flexible. I do not like the idea that each side can retain missiles in Asia and Alaska. The Soviet missiles pose an unnecessary threat to the Asian countries. Nor is there any need for us to site missiles in Alaska. There are two other difficulties: one linked with the FRG's missiles. Personally, I believe the FRG, France, and Britain should be excluded from this first step toward a more comprehensive agreement. The other difficulty is the problem of verification. I do not believe it is possible to monitor the observance of an agreement without very extensive on-site inspection [inspektsiya na mestakh].

[Shalnev] Yet you think there is a chance of rapidly reaching an agreement?

[Carter] I think this will be done.

[Shalnev] As I understand it, a large part of the Kremlin talk was devoted to regional conflicts, indcluding the Near East situation. What is your position?

[Carter] Personally, I would prefer to convene an international conference on the Near East with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the interested parties -- principally Israel and its neighbors. The five permanent members of the Security Council could play a substantive role: They could provide a forum for the sides in the conflict to present their position under the close attention of the world press. The five permanent members, of course, could provide guarantees that any agreements that might be reached would be observed. There would also be a need to finance certain elements of a possible peace agreement: for instance, compensation to the Palestinians for their lost property and the restoration of the economy in the occupied territories. It seems to me that the problems between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and the Palestinians should be solved through bilateral or direct talks.

[Shalnev] Along the lines of Camp David?

[Carter] I would not draw parallels that far, since there are differences of course.

[Shalnev] One last question: Who will be the next president of the United States? A Democrat or a Republican?

[Carter] I believe it will be a Democrat... I want to say that it seems to me that arms control problems ought to be a key issue in the election campaign.

...A lot of what the former U.S. President said is disputable: This applies, in my view, to his plan for a Near East settlement, a plan which clearly relies on the Camp David model -- "Carter's brainchild," which, if not stillborn, at least had very major birth defects. Some of his ideas on medium-range missiles are also disputable: In opposing missiles in Asia and Alaska, Carter nonetheless tried to demonstrate the "need" to retain missiles in West Germany -- that is, 72 Pershing 1A's..

But after all, he is a U.S. President. Albeit a former one...

PRAVDA PROFILES GORE, NOTES ARMS CONTROL INTEREST

PM080957 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

["Own correspondent" dispatch: "Is Gore on the Way Up"]

[Text] Another name has been added to the list of official contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination. Senator Albert Gore from Tennessee has declared that he intends to seek nomination in the struggle for the White House in the 1988 elections. He is the sixth Democrat to enter his intention to seek the country's highest office.

Despite his youth -- he is only 39 -- Gore is a relatively well-known politician. This is partly becuase his father was a popular congressman and senator for over 3 decades, so that people are familiar with the name. The son has followed in his father's footsteps.

As to his political persuasions, Gore is considered to belong to the "center" of the Democratic party. As a lawmaker he has been relatively active on questions of nuclear arms control, because he considers the curbing of the nuclear arms race and the conclusion of agreements with the Soviet Union a key task of the present time.

Observers are in no hurry to assess Gore's chances of victory because, since leading Democratic contender Gary Hart dropped out of the contest, an extremely uncertain situation has developed in the party. At the same time it is noted here that Senator Gore has at least one advantage compared with other contenders. Coming from the South, Gore can in principle count on the support of voters in that part of the country, whose influence on national policy has considerably increased in recent years.

'JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE'S' NEW YORK ACTION DECRIED

LD021545 Moscow TASS in English 1532 GMT 2 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 2 TASS -- The anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public resolutely denounced another terrorist act by the so-called Jewish Defense League.

A statement issued by the committee here points out that an attempt to plant secretly an explosive device in New York at the entrance to the Metropolitan Opera Theater where the ballet troupe of the Bolshoi Theater was to have an opening night, was above all a manifestation of cowardice. The document fully rejects claims of this terrorist group for "Defense of Soviet Jews". "Acting under the false slogan of 'defending Jews', they are seeking in real fact to provoke anti-Semitism," runs the statement.

"The New York terrorists wanted to thwart not only a performance," the statement points out. Today actors of the Bolshoi Theater are more than representatives of Sovie culture, they are envoys of the Soviet people, and they brought the Soviet people's conficence in the triumph of wisdom over the forces of destruction to the USA.

ZHAO, DENG COMMENT ON CHINESE REFORM EFFORTS

LD290446 Moscow TASS in English 0036 GMT 29 Jun 87

[Text] Beijing June 28 TASS -- "The main purpose of the reform of the political structure implemented in China is the development of socialist democracy, the combination of the development of democracy with the development of the legal system." This was said by Acting General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhao Ziyang. XINHUA news agency reports that during a conversation with a group of members of the Japanese Cabinet, headed by Japan's Foreign Minister Tadashi Kurinari, taking part in the fifth Japanese-Chinese conference at a ministerial level, the Chinese leader noted that the position of the CPC as the ruling party cannot be altered, but that it is necessary to change the methods of leadership. This problem should be resolved above all in the process of the reform of the political structure implemented in the PRC.

It is necessary to divide the functions of the party and the government, to alter the situation when the functions of the party and the government are not divided or the party replaces the government, Zhao Ziyang said. Noting that "the Chinese reform is all-embracing, since it is not only an economic reform but also a political reform that is implemented in the country," he said that the reform cannot be implemented overnight, since the PRC has no experience and can advance only in the process of quest.

"In order to develop its economy, China must implement reforms in the economic, political and other areas," said Chairman of the Central Advisory Committee of the CPC Deng Xiaoping, who also had a meeting with the Japanese ministers. This task cannot be implemented in several years, he said. It will take 50 or even 100 years to be carried out. He said that it might also take many decades to unite China, including the solution of the problems of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.

DOBRYNIN PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO MONGOLIA

Seen Off by Medvedev

LD051823 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Jul 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A CPSU delegation led by Comrade Dobrynin left Moscow today for Ulaanbaatar to participate in a consultative meeting of communist and revolutionary democratic parties for peace, security, and good-neighborly cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region. At the airport the delegation was seen off by Comrade Medvedev and responsible workers of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee.

Talks With Batmonh

LD061013 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0915 GMT 6 Jul 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 6 Jul (TASS) -- Jambyn Batmonh, chairman of the Presidium of the MPR Great People's Hural and general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee, has received the CPSU delegation led by A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. It arrived in the Mongolian capital to take part in the consultative meeting of communist and revolutionary-democratic parties "for peace, security and good-neighborly cooperation in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region."

The Mongolian leader spoke about the situation in the country and about the basic directions in the work to fulfill decisions of the 19th MPRP Congress and of the subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee. He spoke highly of his recent conversation with M.S. Gorbachev.

The head of the CPSU delegation informed Batmonh about the results of the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum and of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and about the working unfolding in the fundamental restructuring of the management of the Soviet economy. An exchange of views was held on a number of international matters. The hope was expressed that the meeting opening in Ulaanbaatar will serve to strengthen relations between the fraternal parties and to infensify the struggle for peace and security in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region.

Addresses Asian-Pacific Meeting

LD070438 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0410 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar 7 Jul (TASS) -- A.F. Dobrynin, CPSU Central Committee secretary and leader of the CPSU delegation, has spoken at the consultative meeting of the representatives of communist and revolutionary-democratic parties "for peace, security, and goodneighborly cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region," which opened today in the Mongolian capital.

The problems of this extensive region, he said, are close to the Soviet Union, as an Asian-Pacific state. The Soviet program for ensuring peace and security in this part of the planet was set out by M.S. Gorbachev in this Vladivostok speech.

Founded on an understanding of the existing realities, this program is based on a universal approach to the principles of setting up international relations in the present epoch, and on a new way of thinking. All countries of the region, irrespective of their socioeconomic set-up or their foreign policy; line, are invited to the dialogue. A convincing example of the fruitfulness of just such an approach is the Delhi Declaration on the principles of the creation of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons.

The head of the CPSU delegation stressed the support that the party and the Soviet Government consistently render to the peace initiatives of the socialist states of Asia, and to the positive ideas put forward by other countries of the region.

Batmonh Speech

PM081151 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For Peace, Security, and Good-neighborliness"]

[Excerpt] Ulaanbaatar, 7 Jul -- The consultative meeting of representatives of communist and revolutionary democratic parties "for peace, security, and good-neighborly cooperation in the Asia and Pacific region" opened in the Mongolian capital today.

J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] greeted the emissaries of 21 communist and revolutionary democratic parties of Asian and Pacific countries.

Contrary to the people's fundamental interests and through the fault of reactionary imperialist circles, the Mongolian leader emphasized, individual zones of the Asia and Pacific region are being turned into bridgeheads for nuclear missile means, being covered with a dense network of military bases, and becoming an arena of conflicts. In what ways is the dangerously explosive situation to be overcome and are lasting peace and security really to be ensured in the region? Today the peoples see the answer to these questions in the constructive initiatives and proposals of the socialist and other peace-loving states, which express profound awareness of their responsiblity for the fate of mankind and the desire to resolve global problems of mankind's survival in close combination with ensuring regional security. In this connection the MPRP attaches special significance to the Soviet Union's Vladivostok package of proposals.

The improvement of the political atmosphere in the region, the ensuring of genuine peace and universal security, and the removal of the nuclear threat, J. Batmonh pointed out, can be achieved only on the basis of joint efforts by all states and public forces in the region. It is our conviction that the communist and workers parties marching in the front ranks of the peace champions movement are called upon to play an important role in this. There is no more urgent task for them today than that of rallying all antiwar, peace-loving, and democratic forces in the struggle to avert the threat of nuclear war and end the arms race, for peace and the people's security.

He voiced firm confidence that the interests of ridding the vast Asia and Pacific region of the pernicious nuclear arms race and of military confrontation and the peoples' will to live under conditions of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world will prevail over the adventurist, aggressive aspirations of imperialism's most bellicose forces. The realities of the nuclear missile age demand this.

The MPRP, true to the ideas of peace, friendship, and international solidarity, the MPRP leader said, has come out resolutely in support of the idea of holding a meeting of representatives of communist and workers parties of countries in the Asia and Pacific region on questions of peace and security in the region. We hope that our meeting will enable us better to learn each other's positions and will promote the pooling of the fraternal parties' efforts and their cooperation in the struggle against the danger of war and to ensure a peaceful future for the peoples of the region. [passage omitted]

Mongolian Coverage of Meeting

For Mongolian reportage on the Asia-Pacific consultative meeting of communist and workers parties held in Ulaanbaatar beginning 6 July see the International Affairs section of the 8 July East Asia DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

KARENIN COMMENTS ON WEINBERGER'S JAPAN VISIT

OW011045 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 30 Jun 87

[Karenin commentary]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's official visit to Japan has ended. Concerning his visit, military commander Karenin writes as follows:

Making the best use of his stay in Japan, Secretary Weinberger tried to stir up enmity against the Soviet Union. This was clearly revealed when he met with Defense Agency Director General Kurihara, Prime Minister Nakasone, and Foreign Minister Kuranari. It appears that Secretary Weinberger embellished every subject he discussed with his own concocted anti-Soviet tales. For example, when discussing the Iran-Iraq war, he talked about the so-called Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf. As is widely known, however, it is not Soviet vessels that are cruising the Gulf, but U.S. warships. What is more, their number is increasing.

Concerning the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on medium-range missiles, Secretary Weinberger complained about the Soviet position of retaining 200 warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. He did not refer, however, to the repeated Soviet offers that it is ready to abolish its warheads in the Asian part if the U.S. offensive nuclear devices in South Korea and Japan and aboard vessels in the Pacific are withdrawn and Soviet territory gets out of the range of U.S. missiles. When he called on Japan to increase its military strength and step up military activities within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Secretary Weinberger again talked about the growing Soviet threat, which is nonexistent. Secretary Weinberger particularly stressed the so-called threat posed by Soviet submarines. In this connection, he repeated the groundless charges made against Toshiba Machine Company. He claimed without hesitation that the company's delivery of machine tools to the Soviet Union caused great damage to the United States. This is very clearly a far-fetched notion. One need not be a military expert to realize this. Four machine tool units cannot possibly undermine the defense of such a military power as the United States.

Nevertheless, Secretary Weinberger asked Japan to further restrict exports to the Soviet Union. Judging from every angle, the secretary succeeded in winning Japan's support on this issue. The Japanese negotiators promised to take appropriate discriminatory measures against the Soviet Union.

However, his move to put up more obstacles to Japanese-Soviet trade was not solely aimed at serving an anti-Soviet purpose. He did so largely for the benefit of the U.S. business world, which wants to have Japan, its economic rival, weakened. His rude pressure on the Japanese government should be viewed from this viewpoint. Japanese machine industrial enterprises are now faced with difficulties on foreign markets. They have been experiencing a marked drop in their profits since January this year, due to the decrease in orders as a result of the high yen and the actual restrictions imposed on exports to the United States. Under these circumstances, they are pinning high hopes on expanded exports to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The United States is trying to eliminate this possibility.

Secretary Weinberger's position on selecting the Air Self-Defense Force's next-generation support fighter aircraft indicates that he is seeking to benefit the U.S. economy by sacrificing Japanese interests. The United States opposes the development of the new aircraft by Japanese enterprises. In the negotiations in Tokyo, Secretary Weinberger tried to get Japan to agree to purchase U.S.-made aircraft. In fact, he brought up the names of F-16 and F-18 fighter-bombers. He also proposed a plan for remodeling F-15 fighter planes, which Japan is now buying from the United States.

It was no accident that at his meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone, Secretary Weinberger touched on the selection of the Air Self-Defense Force's fighter aircraft and said that there is a serious anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S. Congress over the trade imbalance between the two countries.

It also cannot be overlooked that Secretary of Defense Weinberger tried to further increase Japan's burden by raising its share in the upkeep of U.S. troops in Japan. For example, Secretary Weinberger succeeded in obtaining a promise from the Japanese Government that it would work to speedily solve the question of establishing housing complexes for U.S. military servicemen in Zushi City, Kanagawa Prefecture, and that of building a runway for night-time training of U.S. aircraft based on the carrier "Midway."

Secretary of Defense Weinberger's visit to Japan thus reveals that the United States will continue to apply pressure on Japan in every field in the future. If it yields to this pressure, Japan will get further involved in the dangerous anti-Soviet strategy and increase its dependence on the U.S. Government.

SOVIET-JAPANESE TRADE CONSULTATIONS BEGIN

OW280809 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 25 Jun 87

[Text] Soviet-Japanese intergovernmental consultations on trade and economic issues have started in Tokyo. The two sides noted that since the previous consultations held in Moscow in January of last year, progress has been made in trade and economic exchanges between the two countries. Not long ago, an agreement was signed on setting up [words indistinct] continental, the first Soviet-Japanese joint venture. Japan ranked the third among the Soviet trade partners with the West last year. However, Malkevich, leader of the Soviet delegation and first deputy foreign trade minister, stressed that the anti-Soviet action of the Japanese Government regarding Toshiba Machinery's export of [words indistinct] to the USSR does not contribute to the promotion of bilateral relations.

Regarding the signing of a long-term economic cooperation agreement, the Japanese side links the development of trade relations with overall political relations. The two sides agreed that the trade imbalance, involving Japan's trade surplus amounting to $1.2 billion, should be corrected.

JAPANESE-USSR ECONOMIC TALKS IN TOKYO VIEWED

OW010835 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 29 Jun 87

[(Yurov) commentary]

[Excerpts] An economic conference was held recently in Tokyo between the Soviet Union and Japan. Radio Moscow economic commentator (Yurov) writes as follows in this connection:

Holding such meetings regularly was decided when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Japan last year. [passage omitted]

Some achievements have been made in developing trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. However, there have also been many problems between the two countries. There is a trade imbalance, with Japan's surplus reaching $1.2 billion in 1986. The trade growth rate is less than 1 percent. This is partly attributable to the absence of a long-term government-to-government agreement on economic cooperation. The Soviet Union has already concluded such agreements with many West European countries.

These and other issues were discussed at the recent Soviet-Japanese economic conference. Soviet delegation head Malkevich proposed that a government-to-government agreement be concluded. Both sides reached some agreement on the need to reduce the trade imbalance, but this proposal for a long-term government-to-government agreement was rejected by the Japanese side. What is more, Japan's Vice Foreign Minister Kitamura expressed his views from a standpoint that intermingles political and economic issues.

Generally speaking, Japan's position was ruled by this standpoint at the recent economic conference in Tokyo. The noisy claim that Toshiba Machine Company exported machine tools in an illegal way is nothing but an expression of Japan's politicized approach to economic relations with socialist countries. This issue was first raised by the U.S. Government, evidently for a political purpose. That is, it was raised to disturb improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviet delegation made necessary judgments on the basis of this perception at the bilateral meeting in Tokyo.

Incidently, no one will probably try to refute the truth that normal development of economic relations can improve the overall climate of political relations. In this sense, there is a practical connection between the economy and politics. However, this connection is not an artificial one. It is an objective one. As for various discriminatory trade measures, they not only create discord between the two sides by also damage them. According to data provided by the journal FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Japanese firms have suffered a loss of profits amounting to about $12 billion due to various restrictions on their trade with the Soviet Union.

A joint achievement at the Soviet-Japanese economic conference was the signing of a document on the need to remove the trade imbalance and expand trade relations through rectification of the present trade structure. We hope that the recent economic conference will make a weighty contribution to developing trade and economic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has sufficient energy to develop these relations. At a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee held on 25 and 26 June, General Secretary Gorbachev stressed that restructuring of economic management would open the way for raising the efficiency of our country's economic exchanges with foreign countries.

RYZHKOV, VORONTSOV RECEIVE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR

LD071513 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 7 TASS -- Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the USSR, Naser Hayrani-Nobari, at his request in the Kremlin today.

The ambassador conveyed a message from Iran's prime minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi on matters pertaining to bilateral cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran.

During the conversation, attended by Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy foreign minister of the USSR, the sides considered matters related to Soviet-Iranian relations and prospects for their development.

IRAN'S 'SINISTER' ROLE IN LEBANON VIEWED

NC051027 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 4 Jul 87

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Algeria's national security services have hunted down and killed (Mostefa Bou Ali), the leader of a rebel group in the Algerian capital. Reports from Algeria indicate that he was the last member of his organization who was still free and that the trial of 28 members and supporters of this group is still going on in (?Medea). These people are charged with murder, obstructionism, the formation of criminal bands, possession of weapons, and looting. According to Algerian press reports, (Mostefa Bou Ali) and his associates intended to (?carry out an armed rebellion) and establish an Islamic government similar to the present Iranian regime. Experts on Near Eastern affairs say that the possibility of direct links between Iran's spy services and these Algerian extremists cannot be ruled out.

Clearly Tehran has stepped up its subversive activities in the Arab world to such an extent that relations with some Arab countries have deteriorated or been completely severed. In recent momths alone, Tunisia, Egypt, and [name indistinct] have cut their diplomatic ties with Iran. Iranian diplomats in Egypt were in contact with extremist circles whose objective was to assassinate certain political dignitaries; and an assassination attempt was made against former Egyptian Interior Minister Hasan Abu Basha. Diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Iran were also severed after Iranian diplomats sought to establish and encourage extremist (?rebel) groups in that country. In addition, the sinister role of Iranian envoys in Lebanon is clear to everyone. They encourage and instigate Shi'ite groups to carry out greater fratricide. It should be pointed out that the blood of the Arabs is being shed not only because of Israeli and U.S. intervention, but also because of the Arabs' efforts to execute orders and directives handed down from Tehran. The outcome of this is plain to see: The schism in Lebanon is deepened further and this, in turn, makes this country more vulnerable to aggression by imperialist and Zionist forces.

What are the foreign policy objectives of the Tehran leaders? This question is being asked with increasing frequency in the Arab world. Are the Iranian leaders trying to propagate Islamic ideas (?that can help toward) fraternity and unity in the struggles against common enemies? Why should they be concerned to establish Islam in countries where it already prevails? It is more likely that these leaders want to impose their political diktat on independent countries. Meanwhile, however, they are losing their political domination in their own country. The ideals which the anti-monarchical and anti-imperialist revolution propounded in Iran have unfortunately remained mere words on paper. Once it become impossible to fulfill promises that have been made to the people, deceitful rulers seek their salvation in distracting the attention of the masses from domestic issues. Is the protracted Iran-Iraq war not being kept going for this reason? Does the continuously growing political adventurism manifested by the Iranian leaders' intervention in the domestic affairs of Arab countries, under pseudo-Islamic slogans, not stem from this? The political logic of this is clear: Keeping a distance from the common front of anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggle is actually tantamount to rapprochement with the enemies of this front. With regret and concern, Muslims are witnessing the shadow of extremism cast by the Tehran mosques mingle with the shadows of the star of David and the (?U.S. emblem), the eagle.

MAURITANIA BREAKS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

PM301410 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jun 87 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Breaking of Diplomatic Relations"]

[Text] Dakar, 29 Jun -- The foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania has announced the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Iran. This step, a Foreign Ministry statement issued in Nouakchott says, has been taken in connection with Tehran's reluctance to seek ways of ending the Iran-Iraq war. Iran's stubborn refusal to hold talks is a threat to peace and stability for all the Persian Gulf countries, the document says.

U.S. GULF PRESENCE 'GAMBLING ON STRENGTH'

PM071552 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Gambling on Strength"]

[Text] Washington, 7 Jul -- The U.S. Administration is still gambling on strength in its Persian Gulf policy and does not intend to withdraw its warships from that region. This is clear from a statement by Fitzwater, press adviser to the U.S. President, at a White House briefing. Asked what is the U.S. reaction to the Soviet Union's proposal that all warships belonging to states which do not belong to the region be withdrawn from the Gulf's waters in the near future, Fitzwater stressed that the United States will maintain its military presence there and that no changes are envisaged in the present course.

This statement by the White House spokesman was made soon after the appearance of reports of new provocative actions by the U.S. Armed Forces in one of the planet's "hot spots." According to UPI, fighters and light bombers based on the aircraft carrier "Constellation," which is in close proximity to the Persian Gulf, have made a number of sorties for the purpose of "operational rehearsal" of collaboration between the grouping of ships headed by the aircraft carrier and the U.S. Navy formation which is in the Gulf.

As an ABC television correspondent reports, citing sources in the Pentagon, the United States is keeping 15 warships and 11,000 servicemen in readiness for escorting Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. 'PSEUDOMEASURES' IN GULF CASTIGATED

PM071613 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Tomas Kolesnichenko "Commentator's Column": "Measures and Pseudomeasures"]

[Text] I'm afraid that new reports are coming in to supplement communiques from the Iran-Iraq front. The United States is making de facto preparations to intervene in this conflict and thus to expand the explosive seat of military tension.

The latest statements by high-ranking spokesmen in R. Reagan's administration make it clear that Washington not only has no plans to withdraw its warships from the Persian Gulf but intends to build up their numbers there in the immediate future on the pretext of escorting Kuwaiti tankers. Fifteen warships and 11,000 servicemen are already standing by. And as of yesterday U.S. F-14 fighters started provocative overflights of Persian Gulf waters in order to "operationally rehearse" possible military actions there.

This is how Washington intends to "defend" the freedom of shipping in the Persian Gulf, this is how it replies to the Soviet Government's proposal that all warships belonging to states lying outside the region be withdrawn from the Gulf's waters as soon as possible, with Iran and Iraq, for their part, refraining from actions which would jeopardize international shipping. After all, anyone who is not blind can see that these measures would help improve the situation in the region and achieve an all-embracing settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

But this simply does not suit Washington. Therefore, it offers pseudomeasures. As if in a drop of (Persian Gulf) water, they reflect the U.S. attempts to assert its military-political dominance in this strategically important region of the globe.

If we listen to White House Chief of Staff Baker, for example, the United States is threatened in the Persian Gulf primarily by...the Soviet Union. It appears that the presence of U.S. warships there is "historical." "For many years," he declared on television, "and for many decades the United States has invariably held the view that the Persian Gulf ought not to become a 'Russian lake.'" And he went on: "I think that if we were to withdraw from the Persian Gulf our ships, whose presence there is historical, the Russians would soon introduce their own ships there...After all, they are nearer than we are."

As for being nearer, this is true. But another distance is visible now -- the distance separating common sense and groundless adventurism. Baker himself can probably perceive this. In that same statement, he vaguely hinted that, under certain circumstances, the United States could "reduce its military presence" in the Gulf.

This would be all for the better. But for the time being, Washington's pseudomeasures and its "gunboat policy" are bringing events in the Persian Gulf close to the final line [poslednyaya cherta] beyond which a regional conflict threates to evolve into an international crisis situation. Is there any need to spell out how dangerous this is?

SFRY'S MAMULA MEETS WITH YAZOV 6 JULY

PM081057 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Meeting at the USSR Defense Ministry"]

[Text] On 6 July a meeting was held between Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, and Admiral of the Fleet B. Mamula, federal secretary for national defense of the SFRY, who is in the Soviet Union on vacation.

In the course of their conversation, which passed in a friendly atmosphere, questions of the expansion of Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in the military sphere were discussed and the sides' desire to develop ties between the armed forces of the USSR and Yugoslavia was confirmed. Views on topical problems of security in Europe and the world were exchanged.

Taking part in the conversation on the Soviet side were Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, and on the Yugoslav side M. Veres, SFRY ambassador to the USSR.

TANJUG Reports Meeting

LD071256 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1220 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 7 Jul (TANJUG) -- Admiral of the Fleet Branko Mamula, federal secretary for national defense, who is staying on a short vacation in the USSR, has had a meeting with his host, Army General Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense.

During the talks, which passed in a friendly atmosphere, there was consideration of questions of Yugoslav-Soviet inter-army cooperation and current questions of security in Europe and the world. The federal secretary also had a meeting and talks with Konstantin Katushev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. The talks related to questions of the military-economic relations of the two countries.

During his stay in the USSR, Admiral of the Fleet Branko Mamula will visit some places and institutions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

YUGOSLAV SOCIAL SCIENTISTS CONFER IN MOSCOW

PM261049 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

["Own information" report: "Consultations Are Under Way"]

[Text] Party and scientific consultations of representatives of the CPSU and the LCY on the theme "Socialism and Democracy" opened 24 June in Moscow at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. Taking part in them are Soviet and Yugoslav social scientists and experts in the sphere of philosophy, law, and political science.

PRAVDA REPORTS GORBACHEV MEETING WITH WEIZSAECKER

PM081103 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 Second Edition pp 1-2

["M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting With R. von Weizsaecker"]

[Text] On 7 July M.S. Gorbachev met FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker in the Yekatarinskiy Hall of the Kremlin Palace. While greeting the president and Foreign Minister Genscher, who accompanied him, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev recalled that during the latter's visit to Moscow last year, agreement seemed to have been reached on "opening a new page" in relations between the two countries. However, to date, it has remained unfilled, and at one time there was even a threat that it would be shut. Fortunately, this did not happen. It is precisely in this light that we are regarding the present visit of the FRG president.

In its attitude to the FRG, the Soviet Union takes account of its potential and possibilities and of its place in Europe and the world proceeds from the premise that the centuries-old history of links between the two countries -- in which there has been much which is grave as well as positive -- obliges them to relate to one another in a proper fashion. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev recalled that even during the most grave times of the last war, a sense of reality did not fail us. We did not confuse the German people with the Nazi regime, and we do not accuse them of the disasters which Hitler's aggression brought us.

We are constructing our present policy on a realistic evaluation of the possibilties of FRG participation in changing for the better the situation worldwide and in Europe. And we are of course calculating on a realistic evaluation by the FRG leadership of the role and possibilities of the Soviet Union.

In renovating our internal policy and implementing restructuring, we believe that as early as during its first stage possibilties are arising to bring relations with the FRG, and with other countries, to a new level, to impart a dynamic nature to them. We can see that in many layers of West German society, there is a reciprocal aspiration to develop relations with us in the most varied areas. All kinds of exceptional situations may arise. No one is insured against this. But if we adhere firmly to the main point -- a principled course -- any questions can be settled.

The two parties agreed that it is necessary to build relations between such states as the FRG and the USSR on a solid, long-term basis looking toward the year 2000 and beyond.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev welcomed Richard von Weizsaecker's statement about the Moscow Treaty and other treaties between the FRG and the socialist countries as a basis of the FRG's policy with regard to Eastern Europe. But when, he noted, we hear from time to time that the "German question" is open, that not all is clear with the "lands in the east," and that Yalta and Potsdam are "illegal," doubt arises: Has the FRG leadership made up its mind to consistently adhere to this treaty?

A sound approach to the question of relations between our countries at the present time and for the future will meet with an identical response on the part of the Soviet leadership, Comrade Gorbachev stressed. But it needs a policy which is not subject to fluctuation, or to an opportunist reaction to transient events and which reflects one's own, and not anyone else's, interests.

The opportunity exists to rethink relations between the two countries. We are prepared for this, but we must rid ourselves of complexes, political myths, and seeing the image of an enemy in the Soviet Union.

Solid relations between the FRG and the USSR would be of truly historical significance. Remaining as they are, in their own systems and their own alliances, both states can play a very big role in world developments. Stability in relations between them means stability in Europe and meets their own interests and also the interests of the European and world community of states.

A lively exchange of opinions on the concept of the "common European home" and the role in it of the Helsinki process with its "three baskets" took place. European construction is unthinkable without the active participation of the USSR and the FRG. The Soviet Union has an interest in the security of the FRG being reliable. It is prepared to jointly fill the "second basket," i.e. to strengthen the material base of pan-European development by expanding and improving economic links. It is prepared for a broad exchange on the "third basket," and this is also fully possible if it is not used in the future for interference in internal affairs.

Given certain emphases and nuances in approach to the construction of a peaceful Europe, similarity has been shown on this question in the essentials.

Reflecting on the concept of a common European home, the two parties touched upon the question of integrated processes in Eastern and Western Europe, and agreed that it is time to think about the pan-European process which could serve Europe as a whole. In this connection Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev drew attention to the serious harm which those elements of integration in Western Europe who are oriented toward creating new types of modern weapons in exchange for nuclear ones could bring to everyone. And this at a time when the question is being raised in all seriousness about a reduction in armed forces and all kinds of armaments in Europe, including conventional ones.

Supreme problems are facing mankind -- survival, the ecology, the scientific and technical revolution and its social consequences, problems of mutual information, power engineering, the population. They are soluble, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized, if one is guided by new thinking and one rids oneself of the psychology of the dinosaurs.

Richard von Weizsaecker touched on the question of the German nation. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev replied tht he is not inclined to theorize on this concept in this context. What is of importance now is the political aspect. There exist two German states with different social and political systems. They have values of their own; both have drawn lessons from history and each is able to make a contribution of its own to European and world affairs. History will decide what will happen in 100 years. No other approach is acceptable. If anyone were to take a different path, the consequences would be very serious. There should be the utmost clarity about this.

He recalled the postwar plans of Churchill and the Americans, and said that it is not the USSR that should be blamed for the division of Germany. Today, the two German states represent reality and it is from this that one must proceed.

Bidding farewell to the FRG's representatives, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev assessed the conversation that took place as being rich in content and frank [otkrytost], and expressed the hope that the new page in the mutual relations between the USSR and the FRG as a result of this visit and the further development of the summit level dialogue would be filled with positive content -- political, economic, scientific, technological and sports ties and contacts between the citizens of both countries.

Comrade Shevardnadze, Genscher, Ambassadors Kvitsinskiy and Meyer Landrut took part in the meeting.

DPA CITES FALIN ON PRAVDA OMISSIONS, RUST CASE

LD081006 Hamburg DPA in German 0848 GMT 8 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 8 Jul (DPA) -- Today, Valentin Falin, head of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY and former ambassador to Bonn, stated that many consider the censoring of Von Weizsaecker's speech in the party newspaper PRAVDA to be "unexpected." Falin left German journalists in no doubt that the decision was made by "certain people" on the paper and was not ordered from "above." Basically the censorship reflects the variety of opinions on the new policy.

In answer to questions about decisions concerning the amateur pilot Mathias Rust, the former diplomat recommended being "patient for a few more hours or days." The investigation has been drawn out because of surprising events. The case will in no way affect the FRG president's visit. He is still sticking to the announcement he made almost 2 weeks ago that Rust will be released soon, for "soon" is a relevant concept. However his period of dentention is now nearing an end.

General Yuriy Lebedev, deputy chief of the General Staff [title as received], explained the successful flight by disorganization on the Soviet side. Before he answered the question Falin passed him over a glass with the comment: "First let's give the general some water."

In a preliminary assessment of Von Weizsaecker's visit, which he called a very important event, Falin expressed hope for a new impetus in relations which should no longer remain a pipedream. "In these last few days some steps have been taken" to reach a better future, he said. The visit could even have consequences into the 21st century and the FRG will then play a central role in this.

General Lebedev condemned the German demand for the exclusion of the U.S. controlled warheads for the 72 German Pershing-1A missiles from a zero-option. An "artificial difficulty" would be built up by this although all other problems in the negotiations "are practically solved already." The warheads clearly belonged to the Soviet-U.S. negotiations. Falin repeated the Soviet announcement of a counterarmament on the part of the Warsaw Pact allies if no agreement is reached.

SPANISH-U.S. TALKS ON BASES MAKE 'NO PROGRESS'

PM071043 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jun 87 Second Edition p 5

[Vladimir Chernyshev "Commentator's Column": "By Hook or by Crook"]

[Text] Madrid -- As expected, the sixth round of talks on reducing the U.S. military presence in Spain, held in Madrid, ended without producing any result.

Spanish official spokesmen declared that the issue "make no progress whatsoever." Both sides continued to defend their own positions at the meeting: Madrid emphasized once again that its demand for the removal of 72 U.S. F-16 aircraft from the military base at Torrejon remains unchanged, while Washington continued to reiterate that those aircraft stationed just outside the Spanish capital are "vitally important for ensuring the West's defense."

In the opinion of local commentators, it was Washington that brought the talks to impasse by its reluctance to give a serious hearing to Madrid's demands. The only thing to which Washington consents is to transfer the said aircraft to the base at Moron near Seville. The Spanish side agreed to guarantee U.S. use of the important naval base at Rota, which controls the strategic zone of the Strait of Gibraltar, and even agreed to permit the presence of F-16 aircraft on Spanish territory "in cases of emergency." At the same time, Madrid firmly insists on its demand for the removal from Spain of the aircraft stationed at Torrejon.

The local press reports that the Pentagon appears to be starting to come round to the idea that its aircraft will still have to quit the Torrejon base. The newspaper EL PAIS writes that Washington intends to delay announcing its enforced consent until the fall so as to transfer that question to the talks on extending the 5-year Spanish-U.S. bilateral treaty, which expires next May. In this way Washington wants to reserve for itself a 5-year period for the "phased" withdrawal of its 401st Wing of F-16 aircraft from Spain. At the same time, the Americans showed obvious displeasure when Madrid warned that it would also suspend the current talks with the Atlantic alliance unless progress was made during the discussion of the question of reducing the U.S. troops in Spain.

Spain declared that it would refuse to extend the treaty with the United States if its position was not taken into account by November of this year. Less time remains. by all accounts, however, Washington is continuing to use the old tactic of dragging out the talks on reducing its military presence in Spain in the hope of making Madrid more tractable by hook or by crook.

RYZHKOV MEETS WITH VRANITZKY, MOCK IN VIENNA

LD081054 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT 8 Jul 87

[Text] Vienna July 8 TASS -- Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who arrived on an official visit here, paid a visit to Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. He also paid a visit to Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Austria Alois Mock.

STANDING COMMISSION TO INSTITUTE SECRET BALLOT

LD010835 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 1 Jul 87

[Text] Another standing commission is to be added to those in the Moscow Soviet: a commission on questions of restructuring the management of the economy. The question of its creation is on the agenda for discussion at the first session of the Moscow soviet of the new convocation which takes place today.

This is an organizational session. In particular the executive committee of the Moscow soviet and the heads of 20 other standing commissions will be elected. Unlike in past years, the chairman of the executive committee, his deputies and the members of the executive committee will be elected by secret ballot.

PLENUM FORMULATES 'PACKAGE OF CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS'

PM010823 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Jun 87 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Deepening Restructuring"]

[Text] Vladimir Ilich was deeply and movingly gratified by those key moments in history when his own party smashed its enemies' predictions by displaying intellectual flexibility and the flexibility of the entire organism. This was precisely the feeling which filled him at the time of the conclusion of the 11th congress, which determined a new phase in the struggle for socialism -- the last congress which he personally prepared and conducted.

This is also precisely the feeling we are experiencing today on familiarizing ourselves with the essence and spirit of the decisive steps by the party which have led from April to the 27th congress and on to January and which are now directly unleashing innovative ideas and injecting them into every cell of the social organism. The strongest impulses of Marxist thought, revolutionary will, and historical responsibility. [sentence as published] The great achievements of the last 70 years are placed by the party at the greatest service of the people and inscribed in world history as an inalienable gain. The party is tackling the logjams of unresolved problems and intractable difficulties with Leninist indomitability and dialectical penetration and embarking on clearing the way, opening wide the door to the future for socialism. No, we repeat Lenin's words, we have not lost this flexibility. Quite rightly the plenum participants compared today's act of political creativity by the party with the key moments of the Lenin period: They are close in terms of the revolutionary approach, the depth of analysis, the self-critical and businesslike nature of the discussion, the constructiveness of the decisions.

The Central Committee June Plenum has placed on the agenda a question of absolutely vital significance for the implementation of the 27th congress' ideas and the renewal of socialism's social base. Comprehensively and realistically assessing everything that has been done since April, it has made a new and significant contribution to the process of large-scale transformations, completing, as it were, the harmonious concept of restructuring. Having heard and discussed the report by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the plenum elaborated and approved the "Basic Provisions for the Radical Restructuring of Economic Management" and formulated an entire "package" of constructive ideas recreating a precise system for the rational and efficient management of the national economy.

The plenum adopted a resolution on convening the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. It will be a political examination in restructuring for the party. What has been done to implement the congress' ideas, the main results of the first half of the 12th 5-Year Plan, how the renewal processes are deepening, the prospects for the democratization of life in the party and society -- these are urgent questions to which an answer must be given.

We have embarked on the most difficult period of restructuring -- the period of practical actions -- and the party is assessing with Leninist realism the present stage of its revolutionary work. It is not easy to look the truth in the face, not easy to learn lessons from mistakes and defeats, not easy to seek the way out of an intractable situation, determine the objective, and build the road. But it is a hundred times more difficult to drive hourly forward toward the planned objective. Vladimir Ilich considered an impoverished economy in ruins a more terrifying enemy than the white guard hordes. In comparison with general political and military difficulties, for example, the difficulties of economic work are rooted in deeper soil, as he put it. What is needed here is not an assault but the replowing of entire layers of previous economic practice and also of established procedures and human consciousness.

In January the party convincingly proved the need to make restructuring integrated and comprehensive with the target priorities being clearly defined -- specific tasks for each stage. It resolutely advocated the mobilization of powerful democratic levers ensuring the involvement of the broad people's masses in restructuring.

Even in a short space of time, a substantive breakthrough in mentality can be observed, and the freshness of the moral and psychological climate in the party and society is tangible. The party's course aimed at democratization has fully justified itself, even more rapidly than might have been expected. This can be sensed from the temperament of many social and creative unions -- a literal explosion of spiritual activeness is occurring. It can be sensed from the tenor of life in labor collectives and party organizations, where attitudes toward labor are changing and interest based on world outlook is growing. It can also be sensed from the degree to which the recent elections to local soviets, for example, were marked by people's sincerity, involvement, organization, and trust.

Working socialist democracy is becoming the soul of our life. It is creating a most favorable atmosphere in the assertion of real people's power, the pursuit of an affective cadre policy, and the organization of effective control from the bottom up. "One mind is good, but 100 million is better," as Muscovite S. Pachnov noted in his letter to the CPSU Central Committee. We have in our hands the sacred key to a pure and radiant socialist home. The party is legitimately advancing the slogan: genuinely democratic acceleration for restructuring.

Positive changes in many avenues of restructuring are in evidence. But they do not give us grounds for complacency. The June plenum reached the conclusion that restructuring is not developing as vigorously as might be desired, that as yet the essential changes are taking place only slowly. This applies to the sphere of the economy and ideology, the work of soviet and economic organs, and the life and activity of labor collectives alike.

Indeed, in every sector it is time to sum up the results of what in practice has been reshaped, renewed, and restructured in the 26 months since that historic April. Have the retarding factors been uncovered, have old means and methods been discarded, have people's initiative and creative activeness been stimulated, have the new rights and conditions granted by coordinated party and state resolutions been utilized?

Unfortunately, it is far from everywhere that appreciable results can be seen. It is not everywhere that people are even pondering this kind of self-assessment or the results of 2 years of activity under the new conditions. Moreover, a manifest lag is occurring in the fulfillment of recent fundamental decisions on socioeconomic questions. The keynote report and most of the plenum speeches depicted in full the "geographical spread" of these "zones of laggardness," specifically identified the causes, and cited by name the people responsible for major failings.

In many instances leaders of production and social practice are manifestly not keeping in step with the developing processes in society. Political timidity, ideological unpreparedness, professional incompetence, fear of democratic influences, and also the most primitive inertia and outdated Oblomov-style apathy are making themselves felt. Yes indeed! The very Oblomov-style apathy about which Lenin said: Russia has made three revolutions (we can add today: and has lived through 70 Soviet years), but there are still Oblomovs, because Oblomov was not only a landowner but also a peasant, not only a peasant but also a member of the intelligentsia, and not only a member of the intelligentsia but also a worker and a communist.

The times have given everybody a chance to fully reveal his intellectual and organizational potential and to make his labor and way of thinking meaningful in socialist terms. Not everyone has made use of this chance. Some have defended their inactivity with redoubts of self-justification. This is already becoming a thrombosis in the blood circulation of restructuring. What action is to be taken here?

Remember the advice in Lenin's article "New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Shape." "Since the period of unprecedented achievements in proletarian creativity" and since October and the salvation of the socialist fatherland, the party has been steering in the direction of the New Economic Policy and urging people to get down to the most difficult part: "The foundation of a truly socialist economy," and the skeptics, phrase-mongers, and Oblomovs have emerged...Vladimir Ilich describes the situation as follows: "Those who find this work 'boring,' 'uninteresting,' 'unintelligible,' who knit their brows or panic, or get light-headed in pontificating about the absence of the 'old elan," the 'old enthusiasm,' and so forth -- they had better be 'released from their work' and consigned to the archives so that they cannot do any damage, because they do not want or are unable to contemplate the uniqueness of the present phase, the present stage of the struggle."

The Central Committee listens closely when Soviet people express anxiety about the fate of restructuring and insist on increasing accountability and responsibility for work at all levels. The Central Committee has authoritatively confirmed that the time has come to call to account those who through their inactivity are inhibiting the implementation of overdue transformations. The party is conducting a self-critical assessment of every step by all its formations. The processes of renewal in society must not be allowed to outstrip the comprehension of them in party components and leading bodies, and restructuring in the party itself must not be allowed to lag behind the changes taking place in society.

Of all the priority tasks, the one that currently comes to the forefront is that of improving economic management. The June plenum stated: We have embarked in earnest on the radical restructuring of the state and economic apparatus.

Before constructing the concept of a radical reform it was necessary to analyze the extensive historical experience and find an answer to the new conditions and requirements. It was also important to reexamine the situation at the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties, generalize the results of a whole series of experiments, and interpret the causes of such insignificant economic successes against the backdrop of the profound changes of the past 2 years. The need for radical reform, for the creation of an integrated system of economic management became more apparent. The inevitability of the reorientation of economic growth from intermediate results to final, socially meaningful results became more apparent. It is recognized that there is a close relationship between overcoming the shortages situation, giving the consumer priority in economic relations, creating a reliable anti-waste mechanism, and turning scientific and technical progress into the chief factor of economic growth. Methods of administrative pressure in economic practice will give way to predominantly economic methods.

The party decided to start implementing the reform and radically transforming the economic mechanism at the foundation of our economic work. It is in the basic component -- the enterprise -- that the worker's labor and scientists' and engineers' thought materialize, the interests of the individual and society intersect, and economic and social relations actually take shape. The well-known draft Law on State Enterprise (Association), approved by the Central Committee June Plenum, generalized the main traits of the new economic mechanism. "It is to be hoped that after it has been adopted the law will not be swamped by various instructions regulating its practical use" -- this concern is voiced in letters from working people and it was also expressed at the plenum.

The radical restructuring of economic management, as defined by the June plenum, involves:

First, considerably widening the independence of associations and enterprises, switching them to full economic accountability, increasing responsibilty for the highest possible final results, fulfilling commitments to consumers, making the level of collectives' income directly dependent on the effectiveness of their work, and extensively developing the collective contract in labor relations;

Second, radically transforming the centralized leadership of the economy, improving its qualitative standard, concentrating on the chief questions determining the strategy, quality, rate and proportion of national economic development and its balanced nature, and, at the same time, making a resolute effort to relieve the center of the need to interfere in the ongoing activity of economic components lower down in the order;

Third, carrying out a cardinal reform of planning, pricing, finance and credits, and management of material and technical provision, labor, and social processes;

Fourth, switching from an overcentralized, command system of management to a democratic system, developing self-management, creating a mechanism for activating the potential of the individual, and radically altering the style and methods of party, soviet, and economic bodies' activity.

One occasionally encounters in conversations or even in publications naive and sometimes rather malicious arguments about socialism allegedly being played out and beling unable to function; about restructuring being a covert deviation from communist principles toward the entrepreneurial system and its values. It is typical also that our most inventive opponents are now concerned most of all about the "purity" of socialist doctrine, carefully confining it to the emasculated schemes of the period of the dogmatic "heyday" of Soviet social science. [paragraph continues]

In no way do they want either to know the true history of the formation and development of Leninist socialist practice; hear the merciless indictment by the congress and the January plenum of decrepit dogmas and scholastic refinements; or see the party examining and carefully treating the entire nervous system of the social organism which had endured the stagnation phenomena.

From Lenin's discoveries and behests to present reality, from the interpretation of its processes and phenomena to the determining of the living forms of the Soviet system's qualitatively new complexion...Socialist thought and social practice are seeking a substantive answer to the main question posed by the times: How to create on a socialist basis more powerful stimuli to progress than under capitalism, how to combine planned leadership with the interests of the individual and the collective. The party insists that the way to do it is to strengthen the status of the working person as true master in his workplace, in the collective, as in society as a whole. Working people's interest as masters of production is the most powerful interest, the mightiest force of acceleration.

Out of the needs of our society's present development there arises the necessity to reinterpret a whole series of key concepts and social factors. A concept such as socialist ownership must be filled with more extensive content; the principle of interaction between centralized planned leadership of the national economy and the independence of its individual components and between planned development and commodity-money relations must have comprehensive validation. In short, the present and future stages of social development will make it necessary to update notions about socialism's economic forms.

As is known, socialist economic management is based on the principle of democratic centralism. From past practice it is also known that the centralist principle has resulted in administrative interference and has sometimes degenerated into voluntarism. In present conditions, centralized leadership acquires a qualitatively new complexion. Its sphere of activity is the questions which only the center can solve. It conducts a statewide strategy of socioeconomic and scientific and technical development, regulates macroeconomic processes on the basis of reliable balance, and creates optimal conditions for effective economic activity by enterprises and associations.

The very "philosophy" of the state plan is also assuming a special form. It strikingly expresses the "master" motifs and it is becoming more conceptual, looking far aheead. It contains a set of priorities and goals for the country's development and it determines the guidelines for structural and investment policy, scientific and technical progress, social development targets, and tasks for the accumulation of scientific, educational, and cultural potential and for maintaining the defense capability. To ensure the requisite proportions, the plan determines control figures for sectors and for union republics as well. They are also given to enterprises for a limited number of indicators, thus guiding the shaping of the production program.

But economic normatives and incentives will be the main lever of planning bodies' influence. They generate an atmostphere of businesslike commitment. Under their influence the labor collective, guided by the control figures, finds it advantageous to meet social needs as fully as possible.

In the material and technical supply system it is planned to make a resolute switch from central allocations to wholesale trade. Much evidence has been cited of the way wholesale trade, given the development of enterprise self-financing, deals a telling blow to the notorious shortages and puts a stop to irregular supplies.

Of course, the new system of management cannot be built into the current, archaic prices system. There must also be a radical reform here and a vast amount of work must be done to restructure the entire price system. The country's entire financial system is basically obsolete; by confining itself to immediate, fiscal goals it is shunning the living process of production; banking brainpower is not participating in constructive economic thinking. The party intends to resolutely change this situation. Important, far-reaching decisions have also been made in foreign economic policy, offering extensive potential for direct foreign market influence on production progress and output quality.

The radical reform again raises the question of the quality of the managerial apparatus, this time with irresistible force. The practice of major administrative meddling in the economy and the inhibiting mechanism gave rise to a cumbersome apparatus structure which had a directive and protective function and was in no way concerned to meet social needs. Of course, this apparatus is alien to the new economic mechanism. The developing forms of activity of the basic component of the national economy and full enterprise financial accountability and self-management demand of managerial components at all levels clear orientation toward the solution of specific tasks and maximization of the end result. In the new conditions the managerial apparatus must absolutely master the skill of applying above all economic, value levers.

In the post-reform national economy, the sector headquarters will look completely different -- not a center of chaotic day-to-day economic activity, but a real headquarters: working out scientific, technical, and economic plan guidelines; gearing production and output quality to world standards; interpreting the refinement of sector structure and deepening specialization and cooperation. It has at its diposal sectoral science and centralized funds. It sets up new industrial outposts and reinforces collectives' major restructuring efforts. It has the final word when it comes to forming new professional detachments...This large-scale strategic work also necessitates the enlargement of the sector headquarters themselves.

There is also the pressing matter of developing intersector management. The initial, not altogether complete experience of government bodies which head national economic bodies -- the State Agro-Industrial Committee, Gosstroy, the Bureau for Machine Building, the Bureau for the Fuel an Energy Complex, the Bureau for Social Development, the Foreign Economic Commission -- has been generalized. New Gosplan functions and the fundamental transformation of its structure have been under examination. The territorial aspect of management has attracted close attention. It has been noted on more than one occasion that it is necessary to strengthen in every way the role of local bodies responsible for the comprehensive economic and social devlopment of a region.

The general leitmotiv of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's report, of the extensive debate at the plenum, and of the documents adopted at it is that the success of the radical economic reform will ultimately be decided by the extent to which and speed with which we are able to create a powerful system of incentives encouraging all working people to perform fruitful labor. The question of introducing full economic accountability, of ably engendering the spread of the collective contract, and of flexibly combining highly developed industrial labor with individual activity and the practice of cooperative and family contracts presents itself with renewed force. Labor incentives msut be largely dependent on the satisfaction of the demand for goods and services. Only an integral program of measures can ensure the normalization of goods exchange and market saturation.

Equally insistent was the idea of steadily developing management democratization. Initiative, creativity, and real success begin when a working person feels he is truly a steward of his work, the collective's activities, and the social product.

The party, while elaborating large-scale programs for social transformations and putting forward rational ideas and concepts, is at the same time concentrating all its mobilizing energy and practical work in the masses and in every area of labor, linking long-term tasks to the solution of day-to-day tasks. Soviet people can see and feel that restructuring is developing, deepening, and beginning to bear real fruit.

GORBACHEV DONATES ROYALTIES TO CULTURE FUND

LD011982 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1337 GMT 1 Jul 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 1 Jul (TASS) -- The Soviet Culture Fund has been in existence little more than 6 months, but already one can speak of the first positive results of its work. They were summed up at a session of the board of this public body held in Moscow today. [passage omitted]

A letter from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was read out at a session of the Soviet Culture Fund Presidium:

"Dear Comrades! I notify you by this letter that I have paid into the Soviet Culture Fund R50,000 in royalties received for books published abroad. I would ask you to spend this money on the monument to Vasiliy Terkin on the heroic soil of Smolensk, which immortalizes the heroism of the Soviet soldier in the Great Fatherland War, and which symbolizes our people's great respect for the glorious poet and his literary hero. With best wishes, M. Gorbachev." [passage omitted]

SLYUNKOV ADDRESSES CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

LD031950 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 3 Jul 87

[Text] Propagandist groups formed of party and soviet workers are called upon to assist in the implementation of decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum. The tasks they are facing were discussed today at a seminar-conference in Moscow. Those assembled were addressed by Slyunkov, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He dealt in detail with the main lines and specific ways toward a radical restructuring in the management of the economy and the perfection of the economic mechanism.

PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON 'RADICAL REFORM' OF ECONOMY

PM071116 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jul 87 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Radical Reform -- The Most Important Component in the Restructuring of the Economy"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee June Plenum adopted a program for the radical reform of economic management. This program incorporates everything we have gained from 2 years of practical experience in improving production management and everything offered by scientific thought. The program reflects the lessons of the decades of socialist building and the economic experiments through which new approaches to the leadership of the national economy were tested.

The main question in the theory and practice of socialism is how to create, on socialist foundations, more powerful incentives for economic, scientific, technical, and social progress than under capitalism, how to combine most effectively planned leadership and the interests of the individual and the collective, it was noted in the report at the CPSU Central Committee plenum. This is the most complex question to which socialist thought and social practice have sought and are seeking an answer.

The Central Committee plenum analyzed in depth the need to carry out a radical reform of economic management. By the late seventies and early eighties, the pace of economic growth had slackened. The gulf between ourselves and the most developed countries, in terms of improving production efficiency and product quality, had begun to increase, not in our favor. Machine building was in a state of neglect, its production apparatus was obsolete, and the output produced was less and less up to world standards.

The desire to stop the fall in growth rates by extensive methods, it was said at the Central Committee plenum, led to excessive spending on building natural resources into production and the irrational utilization of those resources, an unjustified growth in demands for addditional manpower and an acute manpower shortage in the national economy, and a fall in the return on fixed capital. In these conditions financial strain in the national economy increased. Spending was covered not by increasing efficiency, but by other means, justified neither economically nor socially. Even currency earnings from the export of raw materials and energy resources were used mainly to resolve current tasks, and not for the purposes of modernization of the economy.

The program adopted by the plenum for radical reform, which is based on the masses' active creativity and the use of full economic accountability, points out clearly the way to overcome difficulties. It puts in motion society's vast social forces and opens up the path to the mass involvement of working people in the management of the economy at every level. The reform strengthens Soviet people's proprietory feeling and feeling of involvement in the radical changes, and creates real opportunities for putting the theory of restructuring into practice.

It was also necessary to conduct a major reconsideration of the problems of the relationship between centralized planned leadership of the national economy and the autonomy of its individual components, between the systematic approach and the money-goods relationship. The party regards them as being in dialectical unity and complementarity within an integral system of management of the national economy. [paragraph continues]

As an integral part of socialism's economic system, the money-goods relationship, through prices and financial and credit levers, will make it possible to control the market, increase the strength and prestige of the ruble, create a cost-cutting mechanism, and strengthen socialism in practice.

In order to step up production, it is necessary to organize economic competition in the country and step up real rivalry among enterprises and organizations, including state and cooperative organizations, to better satisfy the requirements of the population and the national economy. The victors in this competition should receive tangible economic benefits.

Radical reform requires the strengthening of democratic centralism, the formation of a new system of economic ties horizontally and vertically, and the creation of stable economic conditions for economically accountable work by labor collectives within the framework of enterprises and associations, sectors and regions, and a unified national economic complex. The task is no simple one. Its resolution requires more flexible management of expenditure and results at every level of economic activity and the choice of the optimum combination of prices and financial and credit controls.

It is now necessary more energetically to transfer to all enterprises the initial positive experience of collectives working in the conditions of full economic accountability and self-financing. And at the same time uncompromisingly to expose the "havens" of inertia and lack of initiative and to illumiate with the searchlight of truth ecery corner that is shrouded in the cobwebs of indifference, passivity, and parasitism. The cause of the practical introduction of the radical reform will profit by this.

Every day Soviet people gain a stronger awareness that the restructuring of economic management is necessary, that without it we cannot confidently move forward. All the same, we must not be satisfied with what has been done. In a number of areas the restructuring is proceeding slowly and inconsistently. Discipline and order in production are being strengthened too slowly, departments are reluctant to give up voluntarist and bureaucratic methods of management and cling to the old stereotypes, and the new economic thinking is having difficulty in forging a path. Removing these and other brakes in the path of the implementation of radical reform is one of the most important tasks for party organizations and ministry and department party committees.

The plenum set major tasks for the country's economic cadres. The party called on them to a make decisive contribution to the implementation of radical reform. Practical steps in this direction mean skillfully combining the resolution of long-term tasks and the day-to-day affairs of the 5-year plan. Every economist is called upon to gain the deepest possible understanding of the novelty and scale of the current changes, to put the principles of the reform into practice, and to join without delay in active work on the basis of the new economic management methods.

For the management system based on economic methods to work to full capacity, it is necessary to eliminate the economic illiteracy of many leaders and specialists, workers and kolkhoz members, and to give them up-to-date forms of training. It is necessary more rapidly to accumulate positive experience of economic management in the new conditions and make it common property.

Party organizations are called upon to explain in depth to Soviet people that the radical reform of the management of our economy adopted by the plenum and the plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet session is the most profound and large-scale reform in the years of socialist building. [paragraph continues]

In the near future every party organization and all enterprises and sector ministries are called upon to draft clear measures for the practical implementation of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum, including the program for radical reform of management.

The restructuring being carried out by all the Soviet people is a direct continuation of the cause of October and a concrete implementation of the ideals engraved on the banner of our revolution, whose 70th anniversary we mark this year. The best way to mark the holiday is to do more work in every sector of the 5-year plan, to organize efficient collaboration among associated enterprises and sectors to this end, and thereby successfully to fulfill the year's targets in every indicator.

CHITA FOREST FIRES PUT OUT, 12 DEAD REPORTED

OW021425 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 2 Jul 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast: A. Bardo video report]

[Text] As a result of energetic measures adopted in Chita Oblast, the elimination of the last isolated seats of forest fire is being completed.

[Begin video recording] [Bardo] The Transbaykal tayga has begun to return to normal. For 3 long and difficult months the fight against the fires went on without even an hour's break. Thousands of people took part in the struggle, including professional fire fighters, the population of cities and settlements, nonmilitary formations of the civil defense, and army units. Many demonstrated real bravery, courage, and firmness of spirit. To our grief, there were losses of life. Twelve Transbaykal people who went into the fires to save the people's possessions did not return.

The damage to the national economy and to nature is enormous. It will be many years and possibly decades before green forests will again be seen on these burned out hectares of Transbaykal land. [Video shows a log cabin in the forest and A.I. Belyayev, deputy chief of the Central Aerial Forest Protection Base, speaking to an off-camera reporter]

[Belyayev] What happened in Chita Oblast can be called an ecological disaster which occurs very rarely. It was all the more important to organize the fight with the forest fires in all directions. Unfortunately there were cases of carelessness and underestimation of the situation. The Ministry of the Forestry Industry gave the oblast considerable help and sent about 300 airborne fire fighters who carried out a lot of work, not only in fighting the forest fires, but in leading groups of the local population, maintaining radio communications, and other work. At present there are no active fires in Chita Oblast.

[Bardo] However, the continuing hot and dry weather -- the slight rainfall has not affected the situation -- creates a danger of new fires developing. For this reason, the oblast Extraordinary Fire Prevention Commission is not winding up its special powers. The strict ban on entering and driving into the forest zone remains in effect. GAI [State Auto Inspectorate] inspectors and volunteer militia members remain at their posts and the airborne fire fighters are on constant alert.

Aerial protection of the forests is being carried out with precision and the situation is being kept under observation. If needed, people can be transferred to areas of increased fire danger. The experience accumulated during the mongths of struggle with the fires has taught us much, primarily strictness and exactingness in assessing what has occurred, and great responsibility in preserving the forests of Chita Oblast from fires, insofar as a great part of them belongs to the Baykal Protected Nature Zone. [end recording].